OAK PARK'S COLOR LINE **MICHAEL KIRKHORN**

THE NATION

JANUARY 26, 1974 *50 cents*

Vadillo, Siempre (Mexico)



...A COLLEGE
...BRARY
JAN 22 1974
...J. 07019

CLAY STEINMAN
ROBERT ENTMAN

THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF OIL

War Games and Scenarios
The Army of the 1970s
Michael T. Klare

Michel Foucault's 'The Birth of the Clinic'
Marguerite Howe

10-72 10-73 10-74 AG
Upsala College Library
East Orange, N.J. 07018

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDITORIALS

Return to Gunboat Diplomacy

Citizens who still believe what they were taught in elementary school—that in the United States the military are under the secure control of civilian officialdom—had better bring themselves up to date. The situation is changing rapidly.

When Robert S. McNamara was Secretary of Defense there was no apparent cause for alarm; he and his "whiz kids" were in charge. But that was years ago. The National Security Act of 1947, which created the Department of Defense, specified that the Department was to function under "unified and civilian control," and for a time that was the case. Now, however, out of some fifty policy-making jobs carrying the title of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, eleven are held by generals or admirals. One reason for this may be, as John W. Finney suggests in *The New York Times* (January 13), that it is difficult to recruit civilians under present conditions, whereas generals and admirals can always be had.

A recent announcement by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, which received due attention from some of the media and was ignored by others, warned the oil-rich states that they had better watch their step in using oil as a weapon and disrupting the economies of the industrialized West. "We should recognize," said the Secretary, "that the independent powers of sovereign states should not be used in such a way as would cripple the larger mass of the industrialized world. That is running too high a risk, and it is a source of danger, I think, not only from our standpoint but from the standpoint of the oil-producing nations." The Secretary of Defense was talking as if he were the Secretary of State with, we may assume, the permission of the President.

There may be a diplomatic purpose in this reversal of roles. Schlesinger emerges as a spokesman for the Pentagon hawks, while good old Henry Kissinger remains the Middle East peacemaker. The hawks are sure that if Uncle Sam unleashed the Marines and paratroopers on the oil-rich potentates, the Russians would not intervene with more than talk. Maybe not, but the hawks might do well to remember General MacArthur, who was sure that the Chinese Reds would not cross the Yalu when his troops got close to the border.

It may all be a bluff on the American side, but the Arabs seem to be taking it seriously (their counter-threats may also be a bluff). Several of them have publicized warnings that their oil wells are mined and that as soon as American military might moves into action the wells will be blown sky-high. In the Pentagon itself there are cool heads who see the risks of a military adventure in the area. The Marines could land, sure enough, but if the Arabs choose to follow a scorched-earth policy, what then? Logistically, such an expedition would be a nightmare, especially if the Russians decided to risk military intervention. All we can be sure of is that the Pentagon has a contingency plan for everything except a possible reduction in the size of the defense budget. We have a plan, some senior American officers told Drew Middleton, for "any operation you can name, including an attack on Ottawa."

Some talk has also been bruited about (see article by Michael Klare, p. 104) of a concerted move by the United States and Western European countries against the Arabs. That is the pinnacle of nonsense. England, France and Germany are looking out for their separate national interests; they, like the Japanese, will make any deal for oil. Our ever loyal ally, Spain, is in the same fix. Some of these arrangements are on the verge of consummation. France is eventually to receive 800,000 barrels a day of crude petroleum. The total, over a twenty-year period, would be 5.6 billion barrels, worth about $50 billion at present prices. For the moment, the deal involves 200,000 barrels a day for three years, but that is only for a start.

Saudi Arabia has contracted to buy thirty-eight Mirage deep-penetration bombers, and the Saudis may not be disposed to remain indefinitely at the mercy of American military power. If the Americans could not crush the Vietcong, must Saudi Arabia remain impotent? Iran is further advanced militarily than the Arab states. It has reportedly agreed to buy thirty Grumman F-14A fighters at a total cost of $900 million, thus saving Long Island from a depression all its own.

This build-up of the arms race is bad news for Israel, which is said to possess a small arsenal of nuclear weapons. As a last, desperate resort, the Israelis might use them. The forthcoming oil conference in Washington is being held under dubious auspices; it may be another case of too little, too late.

A bizarre side issue is the spying and counter-spying which seem to have been going on between Henry Kissinger and Adm. Thomas Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This fracas may nevertheless be a harbinger of further military interference in civilian policy making.

We can be grateful, in a perverse way, for Schlesinger's warning to the Arabs: he has given us something to think about. In any country, be it Brazil or Chile or the United States, ultimate power is in the hands of the military. The only requirement is that they retain the loyalty of the junior and field-grade officers and the soldiers and sailors. The increasing dominance of the Pentagon in what almost everyone assumed was the province of civilian authority over policy is something to be carefully watched, with nothing taken for granted.

California Puzzle

On September 5 President Nixon told a press conference that his tax returns for 1971 and 1972 had been subject to "a full field review or audit" by the IRS. The statement was not true; no field audit had been made. When the news first broke that the President has not been paying California income taxes, one of his aides said that in 1969 state authorities had ruled that his income was not subject to state taxes. The statement was not true: no such clearance has ever been issued. Is it any wonder, then, that the President's credibility rating remains low?

The California puzzle has not been closely examined

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by the national media. On September 20, William M. Bennett, the one Democrat on the State Franchise Board, sent a memo to Martin Huff, its executive officer, in which he raised some questions about whether the President might have derived taxable income from the San Clemente transactions which had not been reported. At that date, Bennett assumed, as did most people, that the President had been paying California state income taxes. He was told that under Section 19282 of the Revenue and Taxation Code all such matters are "confidential" and cannot be disclosed even to a member of the board. He was also told that the only way the issue could be raised was by having it placed on the agenda for the next meeting. Bennett replied: "Put it on the agenda."

This was followed by a memo from Huff asking Bennett to furnish any information he had bearing on the question—in other words, the vigilant board member was told to conduct his own investigation. The weekend before the meeting was held (December 11), the President's advisers disclosed that he had paid no California income taxes since 1969, and the President himself was quoted as saying (December 9) that he was surprised to learn that he had not paid them. On December 10 Mr. Huff announced that the board had written the President requesting his permission to place his "California income tax affairs in the public domain"; if a reply has been received it has not been announced. Mr. Huff also said that "neither the President, nor any one identified as representing him, has initiated any contact with us. Furthermore, we have issued no ruling in regard to the tax status of the President." At a noisy meeting on December 11, the two Republican members voted against Bennett's motion that the President be sent a tax statement covering the last four years.

Documents released by the President reveal, of course, that he has not paid California income taxes since 1969, and the inference is that he has not even filed returns. The White House has said that the President would have had a state tax obligation of $64,000 if he was required to file a California return. The state guidebook says: "The underlying theory is that the state with which a person has the closest connection during the taxable year is the state of his residence." In effect, the President readopted California as his residence when in 1969 he acquired the San Clemente estate and registered to vote in that community. Voting is one of the prime tests of residence. Mr. Huff has outlined the tests of tax residency in these terms:

> Every individual who is in this state for other than a temporary or transitory purpose. Every individual domiciled in this state who is outside the state for a temporary or transitory purpose. Any individual who is a resident of this state continues to be a resident even though temporarily absent from the state.

In his federal returns the President took the position that proceeds from the sale of his New York condominium were not subject to tax because they were invested in his San Clemente estate. But Section 1034 of the Internal Revenue Code grants the gain upon the sale of residence A only if the proceeds are invested in residence B which is the taxpayer's "permanent residence."

The Sacramento *Union* (January 3) reports that mail

IN THIS ISSUE

January 26, 1974

EDITORIALS

98

ARTICLES

101 Polarization of the Philippines — *John M. Swomley, Jr.*
104 War Games and Scenarios: The Army of the 1970s — *Michael T. Klare*
109 Oak Park Toes the Color Line — *Michael Kirkhorn*
111 The Sovereign State of Oil — *Clay Steinman & Robert Entman*
114 After Coal, Steel: The Challenge of the Rank and File — *William Kornblum*

BOOKS & THE ARTS

117 Foucault: The Birth of the Clinic — *Marguerite Howe*
119 De La Grange: Mahler — *Dennis Sanders*
120 Through the Boroughs (poem) — *Harvey Shapiro*
121 Sander: Men Without Masks — *Sanford Schwartz*
122 Millhauser: Edwin Mullhouse — *Ronald De Feo*
123 Theatre — *Harold Clurman*
124 Dance — *Nancy Goldner*
124 Dunes (poem) — *Paula Rankin*
126 Art — *Lawrence Alloway*

Publisher
JAMES J. STORROW Jr.

Editor
CAREY McWILLIAMS

Associate Publisher
LINDA EDER STORROW

Executive Editor
ROBERT HATCH

Literary Editor
EMILE CAPOUYA

Western Representative
GIFFORD PHILLIPS

Copy Editor, MARION HESS; Poetry Editor, GRACE SCHULMAN; Theatre, HAROLD CLURMAN; Art, LAWRENCE ALLOWAY; Music, DAVID HAMILTON; Science, CARL DREHER; Advertising Manager, MARY SIMON; Circulation Manager, ROSE M. GREEN.

Editorial Associate, ERNEST GRUENING

Washington, ROBERT SHERRILL; London, RAYMOND WILLIAMS; Paris, CLAUDE BOURDET; Bonn, C. AMERY; Jerusalem, HERBERT KROSNEY; Canberra, C. P. FITZGERALD; U.N., ANNE TUCKERMAN.

The Nation is published weekly (except biweekly in July and August) by the Nation Company and copyright 1974 in the U.S.A. by the Nation Associates, Inc., 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10014. Tel: CH 2-8400. Second class postage paid at New York, N. Y.

Subscription Price: One year $15; two years, $27.50. Add $1 per year postage for Canada and Mexico; $2 other foreign.

Change of Address: It is essential that subscribers ordering a change of address give four weeks' notice and provide their old as well as their new address. Please give Zip Code numbers for both addresses.

Manuscripts. All work submitted will be read by the editors. The magazine cannot, however, be responsible for the return of unsolicited manuscripts unless they are accompanied by stamped, self-addressed envelopes.

Information to Libraries: The Nation is indexed in Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, Book Review Digest, Book Review Index and the Public Affairs Information Service.

THE NATION

Volume 218
No. 4

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is running 10-to-1 against Nixon's claim of exemption from the state's income tax; servicemen are particularly angry, since even those overseas still pay state income taxes. Like members of Congress, the President enjoys a special exemption from income taxes in the District of Columbia, but it has now been verified that all forty-three California Congressmen and both U.S. Senators pay state income taxes. Hence it is difficult to escape the logic of Rep. Lionel Van Deerlin's contention: "Either he should or I shouldn't. Our position is exactly the same." Since the President himself has disclosed that he has paid no California state taxes since 1969, the rule of "confidentiality" has been waived and the board is now on notice that he may well owe the state a sizable sum in taxes, plus interest and penalties. The two Republican members continue to take the position that if a tax is due, they assume it will be paid and nothing further need be said about it. But that is untenable; the public is entitled to the facts.

The White Papers

The White Papers on the ITT and milk price scandals clarify little, avoid much, and raise more questions than they answer. The ITT document ignores the fact that the President did not decide to intervene until the corporation had mounted its massive lobbying campaign. No mention is made of numerous behind-the-scenes meetings between corporate and Administration officials. Nearly every top official in Washington was enlisted in the ITT lobby: Agnew, Mitchell, Connally, Ehrlichman, Colson, Peterson and others. Then, too, the White Paper contradicts sworn testimony of Mitchell and Kleindienst, adding to the difficulties of men who are already in enough trouble.

Something in the tapes turned over to the special prosecutor must have forced the President to make these damaging admissions. The telltale sequence of dates is ignored: on June 1, 1971 the ITT-affiliated Sheraton Hotel made its pledge of financial assistance for the Republican convention; a tentative settlement of the antitrust suit was reached on June 17. The on-again, off-again testimony of California's Lieut. Gov. Ed Reinecke confirms the inference that a connection existed between the settlement and the pledge. Also Nixon's harsh words to Kleindienst, coupled with the way in which he backed down when he learned that Erwin N. Griswold, then Solicitor General, might resign if pressured to drop the appeal, point to the conclusion that a deal had been arranged, but then, because of internal opposition in the Department of Justice, had to be postponed and carried out in modified form.

The milk price White Paper is similarly flawed. The President concedes that "traditional political considerations" were involved—here again portions of the tapes probably forced the admission—but argues that Congress would have increased the price even higher. But Congress had not been able to raise the price during a period of fifteen years and the President could have vetoed a rise of which he did not approve. Nor is it likely that his veto could have been overridden. More to the point, it was Nixon—not Secretary of Agriculture Hardin—who personally ordered the increase after he had received information from two sources of milk industry contributions of campaign funds. Announcement of the increase came two days after the President and his aides had met with milk industry representatives and a week or so after Hardin had turned the industry down.

Not only does Nixon appear to contradict sworn testimony of Mr. Hardin in a civil action but he previously had said that he made it a rule not to know about promises of political contributions. Yet the White Paper talks about dairy farmers being part of his political constituency and of the fact that refusal to increase the price might have been "politically disastrous" in certain states. To fob these considerations off by saying that the milk price caper was consonant with existing political mores is no defense, nor is it accurate. The Democratic Party in modern times has conducted no raids on corporate treasuries of the kind carried out with such aplomb by Maurice Stans and Herbert Kalmbach. Testimony by several penitent corporation executives makes it quite clear that the President's emissaries did not hesitate to relate contributions to favors that might be anticipated. Nor should it be forgotten that the President's personal campaign, not Republican Party coffers, benefited from these levies—many of which were illegal.

Launched on November 7, Operation Candor has now been formally abandoned; even the "comprehensive" Watergate White Paper, promised Republicans as a 1974 campaign document, has been jettisoned. On balance, Operation Candor did the President more harm than good. It has been largely responsible for the current national political malaise which might be described as the Nixon blahs. A sizable minority of the electorate fears the possible disruptive effects of impeachment, but a large section of this minority has lost confidence in the President. In retrospect, Operation Candor, as columnist Peter Lisagor has noted, might better have been named Operation Confusion, Contradiction or, in a figurative sense, Cannibalism.

New Losers

The New York City Police Department has researched and printed for internal use a "white paper" which makes more sense than the corresponding documents issued by governments. It blows sky-high the notion that when the states and cities go into the gambling racket civic purity will come into its own. The actual result of off-track betting has been a 62 per cent increase in illegal betting and the invasion of bookmaking by the mob, which always follows big money.

The psychology is simple. A top police official puts it into a single sentence: "A climate has been created to gamble." The off-track betting organization (OTB) operates 118 "parlors" in the five boroughs; its chief success has been to create new losers. The OTB gamblers are less sophisticated than their counterparts at the tracks, so they lose more, on the average. *The New York Times* (January 10) carries a revealing photograph of housewives with babies in carriages, studying charts outside an OTB shop in Maspeth, Queens.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OTB has cut horse betting with bookies in half, but the bookies couldn't care less. Horse betting was never their major interest; in 1971 it accounted for only about 10 per cent of their income. The big money was in football, basketball and baseball, and of course the numbers. The bookies enjoy several advantages over legalized betting. OTB requires cash; the bookies can give credit. They are in every neighborhood. They will take "exotic" wagers—parlays and the like, while OTB is virtuously confined to the official odds for individual races. The bookies have lost many $2 bettors to OTB, and are glad to be rid of them. But many of the big gamblers, the professionals and affluent amateurs, prefer the bookies.

In the January 18, 1965 *Nation*, Milton R. Wessel predicted exactly what would happen if off-track betting were legalized ("Legalized Gambling: The Dreams & the Realities"). For two years Mr. Wessel headed a nationwide federal investigation of organized crime and law enforcement; he was also the chief federal prosecutor at the 1959 Apalachin "Mafia" trial. Some of what he said bears repeating, although it will have no more impact now than it had then—too many suckers have become addicted and like it. Howard Samuels, who heads New York City's OTB, would like to see government in all forms of gambling, including numbers. Currently a plan is being promoted to make Atlantic City an East Coast Las Vegas, one of many signs that myths about legalized gambling are indestructible. Those who accept these myths should—but won't—listen to Wessel:

> The modern wave of gambling in America rolled in during the mid-1930s when state after state, hard hit by the depression, legalized pari-mutuels at the race tracks. The arguments then were the ones being advanced today: Gambling is a human instinct; people should have the right to bet; if gambling were legalized at the tracks, the public could go there and satisfy its urge. The bookies would be eliminated, and the police whom they had been paying off would no longer be corrupted. The improvement in public morality would be sensational—and millions of dollars in extra revenue would be painlessly extracted from the bettors' pockets. . . .
>
> It has never turned out that way. Persons who wanted to bet on the horses did flock to the tracks and did bet huge sums. . . . But it also developed that the worker who could go to the track only on Saturday had his gambling instinct whetted—and the first thing anyone knew, he was betting on the other five days of the week. The New York State Commission of Investigation demonstrated in 1959-60 how legal gambling stimulates illegal gambling. . . . In every city and town the state raiders hit, the seized records of bookies showed that racing business invariably flourished during periods when a nearby track was operating, and fell off when this stimulus was removed. . . .
>
> It is safe to predict that if legalized off-track betting comes to New York City the effect will soon be a far larger play on baseball and football games—and the numbers. And the problem of law enforcement, instead of being made easier, will get even more difficult than it already is—to say nothing of the problem of keeping the legal shop clean.

Polarization of the Philippines

JOHN M. SWOMLEY, Jr.

In the aftermath of American fighting in Indochina there has been talk that the Philippines might become a new "Vietnam." The Philippines, a former U.S. colony, is under martial law and guerrillas are fighting in various parts of the nation. In the southern island of Mindanao a Moslem insurgency is dedicated to secession or an independent Moslem state. Elsewhere in the Philippines a Maoist-led New People's Army lays the groundwork for revolution.

There is a social base for revolution in the unemployment and poverty of the people. More than a million out of a work force of 12.5 million are unemployed; more than 5 million are underemployed. Eight out of ten youths under 25 belong to households making less than $450 annually. Thirty-seven per cent of males under 25, and 47 per cent of females under 25 are unemployed. Nationalist sentiment is strong in the Philippines because its resources are increasingly coming under control of American and Japanese corporations. American investments are about 80 per cent of all foreign investments in the Philippines, or about $2 billion. Giant American corporations control large areas of land used for sugar cane, coconut, pineapple and banana production, while peasants struggle to survive. The United States, which has a major air and naval base in the Philippines, is also providing military assistance and advice to that nation's armed forces.

The strategy for dealing with the threat of Maoist revolution in the Philippines was planned and carried out by President Ferdinand Marcos, who thinks of himself as launching a revolution from the top, which he calls "The New Society." His "revolution," seen by the Left as counterrevolutionary, is aimed at destroying both the Left and the extreme Right, along with many of the traditional oligarchs, but its main thrust is capitalist development through alliance with multinational, and especially American, corporations.

When President Marcos proclaimed martial law on September 21, 1972, he referred to "rebellion and armed action undertaken" by "lawless elements of the Communist and other armed" groups. There were then 145 private armies, some of them composed of extreme right-wing partisans and some hired by wealthy politicians and economic oligarchs.

John Swomley, Jr. is a member of the national board of the American Civil Liberties Union and professor of social ethics at St. Paul School of Theology, Kansas City. He is the author of Liberation Ethics *(Macmillan),* Religion, the State and the Schools *(Pegasus),* The Military Establishment *(Beacon Press) and* American Empire *(Macmillan).*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A newsletter written by an American theological professor in suburban Manila said, "Two nights before the crackdown, we watched, in some awe, a downtown Manila demonstration with the university girls doing a People's China street dance in perfect synchronization and with grim faces. Red banners flew in the breeze. Thousands chanted. . . . Then the TV set went off. Newspapers stopped. All schools were suspended. And we learned that we were all under martial law." The Philippine constabulary moved immediately to round up Communists, to seize warehouses full of ammunition, to confiscate Communist printing presses and arrest numerous persons on suspicion of subversion.

In the two-year period before martial law, the Maoist New People's Army had begun guerrilla warfare in the country, while various groups, some of them Maoist-led, were protesting in the streets of Manila. On January 30, 1970, militant student organizations had united to storm Malacanang, the President's palace and office building. They lobbed rocks, Molotov cocktails and other explosives at the buildings inside the palace grounds. One student organization after another, even on moderate college campuses, came to be controlled by the Communists or groups working with them. The hammer and sickle was openly displayed on posters, banners and manifestoes.

In the Philippines 90 per cent of the wealth is owned or controlled by less than 10 per cent of the people. These oligarchs are ranged in about fifty top families. It is said that some wealthy Filipinos financed or otherwise helped left-wing groups, on the assumption that Filipinos would never accept communism and the right wing would therefore be able to establish control after the Communists had destroyed the Marcos government.

In 1972, a series of banks, government buildings, stores and other establishments were bombed. Water mains were blown up. By September 1972, violence in Mindanao and Sulu had killed more than 1,000 civilians and about 2,000 armed Moslems and Christians, with more than 500,000 being injured, displaced and homeless. Government troops had also suffered casualties. Meanwhile, the New People's Army had grown to almost 8,000 armed men.

One year after martial law had been imposed, Brig. Gen. Fidel Ramos wrote that the Philippine constabulary, of which he is the head, had left Communist Party "front organizations with no significant activity save for propaganda and recruitment discreetly undertaken in urban centers and in the countryside." He pointed to "the arrest and detention of 1,556 identified subversives" and indicated that "activities of a large number of radicals have remained under close watch of the P.C."

Yet I was able, with very little difficulty, to meet with underground leaders one evening in a private home in Greater Manila. One of them, a Roman Catholic priest and former professor with a substantial price on his head, moves with relative ease not only in Manila but elsewhere in the island. He is an organizer for a movement known as Christians for National Liberation. It includes some ministers and priests who function normally in their parishes, as well as others who have gone underground and are fighting or transporting weapons. At present, Christians for National Liberation is too small to be a decisive force. The priest with whom I met is therefore also working with the Maoists. His assignment is to promote a united front of Moslem insurgents with Christian and Maoist groups. He estimated that there were at least 3,000 armed Maoists in the mountains currently functioning as guerrilla bands of the New People's Army. In addition, he asserted that many of the university students who went underground when President Marcos proclaimed martial law are now working in mountain barrios to organize popular support for the insurgents.

This young priest, who earlier had actively promoted Maoism in university and theological circles, readily acknowledged that the underground was not a response to martial law but was intent on a political takeover of the islands. He conceded that martial law had upset its timetable and had made its goal more difficult. That goal is to end American and Japanese imperialism by establishing a Maoist-oriented Philippine nationalism.

The Maoists operate chiefly in the main island of Luzon, but the major military resistance is in Mindanao in the south where some 25,000 Moslems have been confronting the Philippine Army. The strategy of the Maoist-led New People's Army is to build a united front of Christians, Moslems and Maoists into a strong movement to maintain guerrilla activity while waiting for more Filipinos to become alienated by the Marcos dictatorship, and to keep elements of the Philippine Army and constabulary tied down in various islands hundreds of miles apart. The Maoists hope to force the government to spend an increasing part of its budget on military operations rather than on the constructive program of Marcos' "New Society." That program includes modest land distribution to peasants, the building of roads, schools and bridges, family planning, expanded medical services, and the like. It does not, however, include higher wages, unionization of labor, and civil liberties or popular representation in government.

In a speech on September 21, 1973, Marcos confirmed the reports of widely scattered guerrilla fighting. He said, "In some parts of the southern islands, in northern Luzon and Bicolandia there still is occasional fighting between our troops and rebellious bands. . . . There have been recent ambuscades in Cotabato, Lanao and Zamboanga, and outlaw bands still roam portions of Basilan Island. In Jones, Isabella, the government recently lost some men in encounters with Communist terrorists."

Apparently the U.S. Department of Defense continues to view the Maoist and Moslem guerrilla movements in the Philippines with concern. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked Congress for $22.3 million as military assistance to the Philippines for fiscal 1974 to strengthen the ability of the Marcos government to deal with its armed opponents. Moorer said that "We are providing helicopters and transport aircraft, machine guns, recoilless rifles, and other weapons, together with long-range communications equipment." There are also occasional rumors that U.S. pilots and planes are flying reconnaissance missions over rebel territory.

While traveling into northern Luzon and south into the island of Negros and Mindanao, I tried to assess the prospects for the insurgency and the difficulties of counterinsurgency. I visited prisons where political de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tainees are held, and talked with numerous persons in and out of the Philippine constabulary, including a key official of the Communist Party, the former Huk (Communist guerrilla) leader, Luis Taruc; recently captured Moslem and Maoist personnel; newsmen, and Gen. Fidel Ramos, head of the Philippine constabulary.

Ramos insists that "The situation in Mindanao is now under control. The insurgency is no longer escalating." Luis Taruc, who has broken with his former (Stalinist) comrades, told me that he frequently returns to the various places where he engaged in guerrilla activity. He has ties with many people in these mountain barrios. It is his judgment that the Maoists are not a serious fighting force in Luzon, that most of the students who went underground are in private hiding rather than actively assisting the New People's Army.

College professors and students from northern Mindanao also told me that areas where previously there had been fighting are now quiet. Our family drove about 50 miles from the coast to Marawi City, a Moslem center, passing Philippine constabulary checkpoints where security measures had been relaxed. Our car was stopped only once but not searched. This is in marked contrast to other areas where the insurgents are capable of road ambushes or other activity.

In the summer of 1973, President Marcos addressed officers and men of the Philippine constabulary who had been involved in fighting the insurgents. Marcos announced that "the last pocket of resistance in the main province of Cotabato" (in Mindanao) had been liquidated "and for this I congratulate the entire armed forces of the Philippines." Marcos pointed out that in March 1973, the "Moslem rebels . . . had occupied many of the towns in Cotabato" but "now we can say, most of Mindanao has been recovered and is today under the control of the armed forces of the Philippines."

The Philippine Government's temporary success is due to a combination of military operations, amnesty propaganda and long-range socio-economic programs. In addition to the combat activity of the armed forces, the Marcos government organized a civilian home defense force (CHDF) to assist the armed forces. Some 30,000 CHDF personnel in Mindanao were armed and trained to defend their barrios and to maintain "peace and order."

The amnesty program was tied to disarmament. The Secretary of Defense Juan Enrile had printed thousands of "safe conduct passes" which any insurgent could use if he were prepared to stop fighting and turn in his weapons. The pass describes loans he may obtain in exchange for his weapons if he needs money "to engage in legitimate occupations such as fishing, farming, barter, trade and/or other business." For each .22 caliber pistol, revolver, or rifle he can borrow 500 pesos; for each foreign-made .25 caliber revolver or .38 caliber shotgun, he can borrow 1,000 pesos. For foreign-made automatic rifles or machine guns, he may borrow 2,000 pesos.

The controlled press in the Philippines reported on August 13, 1973, that President Marcos had received a delegation of former Moslem guerrillas who had surrendered or been captured. The letter they presented to Marcos indicated that they "felt at one time that it was necessary to bear arms against the government because of the injustice and indifference that our people had suffered for a long time." The letter continued: "Throughout our period of detention, we received exemplary humane treatment from the military, something we did not expect." The letter also referred to the building of vital roads, hospitals, schools and other infrastructure projects. "Soon we also saw many of our brothers, who had been forced to take up arms against the government, settled in some productive occupation or trade, and once more we could speak to our leaders and be heard."

The government has promoted Moslem culture, ordered the army's civic action teams to repair damaged mosques, and has also begun to make plots of land available to landless Moslems. This act of wooing the Moslems from enmity to loyalty has been an important part of the government's program.

The military's civic action program is one of community development which includes building artesian wells, schoolhouses, roads and other projects. The idea was taught to Philippine military contingents by U.S. Army teams. A typical newspaper description in the August 1st *Bulletin Today* reported a "seventy-eight-man United States Army civic action group [that] recently concluded a barnstorming civic action and community development swing into three provinces. . . . They were with a mixed contingent of Philippine armed forces personnel engineers, doctors, veterinarians and dentists. . . ." In the same paper there were reports of a nine-man civic action team from the U.S. Army and of a "ten-member joint U.S. and Philippine Army civic action team."

There is no doubt about the support the U.S. armed forces have given to the Marcos government in its pacification program. It also seems evident that if the Philippine armed forces continue wholeheartedly to back President Marcos, there is little likelihood in the immediate future that guerrilla war will escalate to the point where U.S. combat forces will be involved.

On the other hand, there is a rather widespread resentment against President Marcos for imposing martial law and thereby taking away freedom of speech, press, representation by a Congress and other liberties the people have enjoyed. There is even greater resentment, in some circles, of Marcos' economic actions. When Marcos disbanded Congress he silenced the anti-Americanism of Filipino nationalists who were drafting laws designed to curb American business holdings. Marcos in an interview in the October 26, 1972 *U.S. News & World Report* said ". . . we will offer as much incentive as is possible, and foreign capital will be protected. There will be no confiscation while I am President." He has banned strikes and assured labor peace to the foreign corporations; he has offered tax reductions, a liberalized repatriation of profits and other incentives. Last June, Marcos decreed that foreign corporations that make Manila the headquarters for their Asian operations will be "exempted from all forms of local licenses, fees, dues, imports or any other municipal or provincial tax or burdens."

One of the biggest incentives for foreign corporations to come to the Philippines is low wages, the lowest in Southeast Asia. The minimum wage in the Philippines is 8 pesos a day or $1.20 for an eight- or ten- or twelve-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hour day. Many workers receive a peso or less per hour.

Marcos has provided for certificates of ownership to tenants on rice and corn land, with each tenant getting about 5 acres. But the land reform does not apply to acreage owned by large American corporations engaged in fruit, sugar cane, or other mechanized operations. This means that most of the rice and corn land to be redistributed to tenants will come from small landholders who own fewer than 100 acres, most of them owning 25 acres or less. At the same time that President Marcos has been involved in a land distribution program, he has authorized or permitted the bulldozing of squatters' huts and the removal of poor people from land which large corporations or agri-businesses want to use.

Marcos' concentration on industrial development and foreign investment is apparently designed to build a larger middle class, although few corporations come to the Philippines with the idea of raising the standard of living there. The average yearly income in the Philippines is only about $180. Since Marcos is not lifting the standard of living of ordinary workers and farmers there is eventual danger of their alienation from his regime. Apparently recognizing this problem, and especially the low wage scale of military personnel, Marcos said on September 21, 1973, "I am, under my own personal direction, organizing a fund intended for those who serve in the armed forces. This fund must be organized in partnership with the private sector and must take care of the housing, educational, medical needs as well as the future of military personnel and their dependents." In this way Marcos hopes to tie military personnel to capitalism and to himself as the director of the fund. By the device of a private fund he also avoids a general rise in wages.

The Marcos dictatorship is not a temporary expedient but a long-term action for which the loyalty of the armed forces is essential. At the moment there is little likelihood that the guerrilla warfare in the Philippines will grow into a serious problem. But the Marcos program of turning the country over to the large multinational corporations, while neglecting the poor and cultivating the military, can lead only to polarization of the nation and eventually to more widespread revolutionary activity. □

WAR GAMES AND SCENARIOS

THE ARMY OF THE 1970s

MICHAEL T. KLARE

On November 24, 1972, Tuscola [a mythical Arab ally of the USSR] *launched a large-scale attack on Belton* [a non-Arab ally of the United States] *and scored a number of initial successes. But Belton's counterattacks drove back the Tuscolans. Although Belton contained Tuscola, losses were severe on both sides, and a virtual stalemate followed.*

However, the morale and fighting capabilities of the highly determined and aggressive Tuscolan forces were improved by the expected arrival of Richland [i.e., Soviet] *forces and additional military personnel.*

At this time Belton requested U.S. assistance. The request was approved by the U.S. Government on January 23, 1973, and the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] *deployed a joint task force to Belton as a show of force to attempt to dissuade intervention by Richland.*

So concludes the preamble to the Pentagon's scenario for Operation Gallant Hand 73, the largest military exercise conducted by the United States since the onset of the war in Vietnam. Although top Defense Department officials who witnessed the exercise, held at Fort Hood, Tex. last April, declined to attach any political significance to the scenario, the implications are only all too obvious: Tuscola is clearly modeled on Egypt, while Belton is undeniably Israel. Gallant Hand constitutes, in effect, a dress rehearsal for U.S. military intervention in the Middle East—a tragic drama that almost reached fruition in October 1973, when President Nixon ordered a worldwide military alert and ordered U.S. military personnel to the front lines in Sinai to expedite deliveries of U.S. materiel to Israeli combat forces. Although White House spokesmen insisted that the United States had no plans to send troops into the area, it is worth noting that Gallant Hand was conducted by the U.S. Readiness Command—the Pentagon agency responsible for deploying U.S. forces abroad in a crisis—and that the exercise involved participation by the 1st Cavalry Division, an elite Army unit that is being groomed for a "spearhead" role in future U.S. combat operations in Europe and the Middle East.

Operation Gallant Hand 73 is hardly unique: every year, the Department of Defense conducts hundreds of major training exercises at home and abroad. These are designed primarily to give combat commanders a chance to practice large-unit operations under field conditions. Other purposes, however, often intrude: some exercises are used to test experimental weapons or tactics in a simulated battlefield environment; some—like Gallant Hand—have obvious political implications. Thus, knowledgeable observers would readily conclude that the Administration used Gallant Hand to signal its intention to defend Israel in case of a crippling Arab attack. Similarly, during Operation Deep Furrow, a late 1972 NATO exercise held in Greece, U.S. troops marched with Greek Army units in a "victory" parade through downtown Athens—evidence that we are pledged to defend the Athens regime against its internal as well as external enemies.

Michael Klare is a staff member of the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), and the author of War Without End: American Planning for the Next Vietnams *(Alfred A. Knopf).*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Military exercises are normally conducted for the exclusive benefit of the Pentagon high command, but other groups can learn a good deal by studying them. All too frequently, the American public has no advance warning of U.S. military interventions and operations abroad: as revealed in the recent hearings concerning falsifications of bombing reports in Indochina, the Defense Department will intentionally deceive the public rather than risk the censure of an aroused citizenry. By keeping tabs on military exercises like Gallant Hand, however, it is often possible to detect changes in United States military policy and to sketch Pentagon planning for future wars. Consider, for instance, the evolution of the 1st Cavalry Division.

In October 1964, the Army conducted its most ambitious training exercise of the postwar era—Operation Air Assault II, the first full-scale test of helicopter-assisted airmobile operations. In preparation for this exercise, the Pentagon created a special test unit, the 11th Air Assault Division, and spent months planning tactics and strategy. Although largely ignored by the public, Air Assault II was a revelation to those officers who could read the handwriting on the wall; for even as the 11th Division was fighting a hypothetical enemy in the highlands of South Carolina, the White House was meeting secretly to plan the use of American troops in operations against a *real* enemy in the highlands of South Vietnam. Six months later, the Air Assault Division emerged in Vietnam as the 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile), and the tactics developed for Air Assault II were practiced under actual combat conditions.

Today, with the U.S. ground combat mission in Vietname concluded, the "1st Cav" is back in the United States—but now it has yet a new name and a new mission. In May 1971, the 1st Air Cavalry Division was redesignated the 1st Cavalry Division (TRICAP), and given the job of developing combat doctrine for the "Army of the Future." And just as Air Assault II was a preview of events in Indochina, the TRICAP tests offer a picture of Army participation in the *next* generation of wars.

The TRICAP concept differs from tactics in Vietnam as much as Air Assault II differed from World War II combat. While the 1st Air Cavalry Division combined regular infantry units with helicopter transport squadrons, the TRICAP ("TRIple CAPability") Division combines airmobile forces with tank units, mechanized infantry and helicopter gunships. And whereas the 1st Cav was "optimized" for counterinsurgency operations in a "low intensity" combat environment like that of Vietnam, TRICAP is designed for large-unit operations in the "mid-intensity" environments projected for Europe and the Middle East. "What we are looking for," explains Gen. John Norton of the Combat Developments Command, "is a revolutionary increase in combat power through a new combination of air cavalry, tanks, attack helicopters, mechanized forces, and airmobile infantry and artillery." TRICAP, then, is the very model of the capital-intensive 1970s: highly mobile, machine-oriented, managed by computers, and manned by all-volunteer soldier-technicians. The TRICAP project tells much about Army planning for future wars; in order to interpret this data, however, it is first necessary to reconsider U.S. strategy in Vietnam and the implications of its failure.

During the Eisenhower administration, American defense policy was dominated by the strategy of massive retaliation, which held that the very threat of thermonuclear attack was sufficient to deter any military challenge to America's national interest. But massive retaliation failed to deter revolutionary outbursts in Cuba, Algeria and Indochina, and in 1961 President Kennedy introduced the strategy of flexible response, to provide an enhanced "conventional" (i.e., non-nuclear) response to threats staged at the lower end of the military spectrum. In keeping with the new doctrine, Kennedy authorized a substantial expansion of U.S. ground forces, and encouraged the development of a substantial counterinsurgency capability in the Army.

When the Diem regime came under sustained attack from indigenous revolutionaries, the Kennedy administration—acting upon the premises of flexible response—ordered the dispatch of Special Forces commandos and U.S. Army "advisers" to Vietnam. And when these forces failed to stem the growing revolt, Kennedy sent still more "advisers" to protect the "credibility" of our counterinsurgency capability. Vietnam was fundamentally a *political* conflict, however, and no purely military measure could secure a decisive victory. Ultimately 500,000 U.S. combat troops were deployed in a long and futile attempt to defeat the Vietnamese revolution.

America's failure to destroy the revolutionary movement in Vietnam was a decisive setback for flexible response, and discredited the strategy of using large numbers of ground troops in counterinsurgency warfare. Col. Zeb B. Bradford of the Army has written in *Military Review* that, as a result of Vietnam, "we have learned that, in strategic terms, ground power can be quite inflexible once committed, however much flexibility it may provide on a tactical level. . . . While aircraft and ships can often reverse course and make a clean break, ground forces rarely can do so once engaged." Moreover, once they are employed, ground troops "commit the nation to protect the lives of the soldiers involved and to 'redeem' them if lost." Thus, the use of ground forces *"burns the bridges of easy political or logistical withdrawal."* (Emphasis added.) In the final analysis, therefore, flexible response offered only a "one-way flexibility," by providing the means to commit ground troops in counterinsurgency, but not to "decommit" them once involved.

As long as U.S. involvement in Vietnam was limited to advisers and Green Berets, American public opinion was largely neutral on the issue of the war. But once large numbers of combat troops were committed to a costly and unproductive ground war, public opinion became negative and finally hostile. Ultimately, it became obvious to soldier and citizen alike that the American strategy in Vietnam—with its emphasis on massive ground forces—could not produce a rapid and economical victory. This lesson is not likely to be forgotten quickly: as the nation enters the post-Vietnam era, it is clear that the American people will not tolerate another manpower-intensive ground war of the Indochinese type.

In response to this growing national consensus, the Nixon Administration introduced the "Nixon Doctrine,"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which called for the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Asia, and their replacement with the troops of client regimes (liberally supported, of course, by U.S. air and sea power). The new strategy, according to Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., "will call first for the high-technology, capital-intensive services —air and naval forces—to support the indigenous armies of threatened allies." The new doctrine leaves in doubt, however, the role of ground forces in future military operations abroad. While about everyone agrees that such forces will be needed, most strategists are wary of proposing prolonged ground operations in future interventions. The emphasis is on developing a "rapid deployment" capability within the Army, comparable to that of the Air Force and Navy, and permitting rapid *disengagement* as well as rapid assault.

In the past two years, Pentagon strategists have made a determined effort to devise a new strategic policy for the use of ground combat forces abroad in the coming decade. The new doctrine, which lacks the internal consistency of massive retaliation or flexible response, was introduced by President Nixon and National Security Adviser (now Secretary of State) Kissinger in late 1972 and early 1973. In rough form it states that, in an era of approximate parity in strategic nuclear weapons and of increasing big-power collaboration for the control of low-intensity conflicts, the most likely conflicts ahead will be skirmishes or confrontations involving the conventional forces of the big powers or their most highly armed allies. This position further holds that Moscow's willingness to negotiate limitations on strategic weapons, and to consider the reduction of conventional forces in Europe, does not presuppose a Soviet commitment to desist from challenging U.S. interests at other levels of the military spectrum and in other potential theatres of war. "In a period of developing détente," Nixon warned in 1973, "it is easy to be lulled into a false sense of security . . . and [to] neglect the realities of existing forces of potential adversaries." We cannot "ignore the negative trends that persist: even though Vietnam is entering a new phase, conflict remains in Indochina and ferment exists in other key areas of the world such as the Middle East where the interests of the major powers are involved."

With the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from Vietnam, Europe and the Middle East have become the main focus of Pentagon planning. Army strength has been cut in half overall, but the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) is being maintained at full strength and has first call on new weapons and equipment. "Other parts of the Army have been told to get along with fewer men," Gen. Michael S. Davidson said in 1972, "so that we can maintain our fighting strength in USAREUR." To justify this allocation of manpower, Army planners argue that Europe and the Middle East are the primary arenas in the global power struggle between the United States and the USSR: Europe, because of its large population and growing economic influence; and the Middle East because of oil. Should the Soviet Union gain a commanding position in this contest, American supremacy would be conclusively usurped, and the USSR would become the world's prime superpower. But while this analysis recalls early cold-war brinkmanship, the role assigned to U.S. ground forces has changed radically: instead of serving as a front-line defense against anticipated Soviet attacks, U.S. forces are now seen as a predominantly *political* instrument needed to offset mounting Soviet influence in Europe, and to preserve America's own influence in the region.

While few strategists believe today that the Soviets would launch a conventional assault on the heartland of Europe, they do not rule out lesser thrusts—perhaps in Scandinavia or the eastern Mediterranean—designed to undermine confidence in America's commitment to assist NATO in repelling such attacks. Many Pentagon analysts believe that Soviet policy makers are "probing for U.S. soft spots, for chinks in U.S. policy that suggest irresolute or weak response to Soviet moves." Although rarely put into words, there is an unspoken concern that such "soft spots" include the growth of anti-military and anti-NATO movements in many European nations. And while little hard evidence has been produced to support this belief, Defense Department spokesmen insist that strong ground forces are needed "to stand as a credible, battle-ready deterrent to adventurism by the Warsaw Pact leaders or to miscalculation of our will and determination." This essentially political role for the Army in Europe is underscored by Operation Deep Furrow in Greece and by recent exercises in Norway which were designed, according to Defense officials, to demonstrate America's resolve to intervene in these countries if their current, pro-NATO governments came under attack from Communist forces.

At the moment when U.S. paratroopers were landing in Greece as part of Operation Deep Furrow, other U.S. servicemen were establishing a beachhead on Norway's northern coast as part of Operation Strong Express, a NATO training exercise ostensibly designed to test Allied combat capabilities above the Arctic Circle. As one component of this exercise, U.S. Marine technicians from Cherry Point, N.C. installed a computerized air-control base on a remote Norwegian mountain only a few minutes flying time from the Russian base at Murmansk. Strong Express, like its counterpart in Greece, was predicated on the belief that NATO has become vulnerable to Soviet pressure on its "flank" areas to the north and south. Through their growing naval presence "the Soviets are applying pressure on NATO's flanks in the Norwegian Sea and in the eastern Mediterranean," Pentagon correspondent Brooke Nihart observed in 1972. "By this physical reality and the resulting psychological fears, the Soviets are trying to imply the isolation of the flank members—Norway and Iceland, Turkey and Greece—from NATO's main body."

Norway's north coast, with its strategic air bases on Russia's Arctic gateway to the North Atlantic, is considered of crucial importance to NATO defense strategy. Fearing that Norway would be tempted to capitulate in the event of a determined Soviet attack on its northern borders, senior U.S. strategists concluded that a major "show of force" was needed to convince Norwegian leaders of NATO's commitment to intervene in the event of a Soviet attack. Strong Express was the result. Involv-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing as many as 300 warships, 700 aircraft and 64,000 soldiers from seven nations, this exercise constituted the biggest NATO field maneuver in northern Europe since World War II. And, like Deep Furrow, it had clear political overtones. As reported by John G. Norris of *Sea Power* magazine, Strong Express incorporated the assumption that "extreme leftist forces in 'Blue' country [Norway] were agitating against the planned NATO exercise." Strong Express demonstrated, in other words, that U.S./NATO forces are prepared to intervene in Norway should radical political forces threaten the neutralization of their nation.

While Pentagon spokesmen point to the Soviet Union as the principal threat to U.S. interests overseas, they do not neglect the threat of attack from other quarters—particularly from the increasingly well-armed nations of the Third World. In fact, as U.S. stockpiles of crucial raw materials are depleted, access to foreign supplies of these materials will become an increasingly important concern of U.S. foreign policy. Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff (and former Commander in Vietnam), asserted in 1972:

> It would be very comforting to view the world as some sort of emerging Utopia, but to do so one must blot out the problems associated with the growing U.S. dependence on access both to markets and to materials sources, especially energy sources, beyond our shores. It means discounting the fact that the world is growing smaller with more and more countries interacting in world affairs which will create more opportunities for friction. And lastly, it means minimizing the awesome reality that formidable military force is in the hands of leaders whose ideologies and purposes are not yet compatible with ours.

Uncertainty and continuing international turbulence are common themes in Army strategy statements. In a review of potential military contingencies for the 1970s, Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Bruce Palmer observed that "we face a turbulent, dangerous period of built-in conflict situations worldwide." These contingencies, according to Palmer, are "not necessarily ideological in nature," but are "rooted in the economic facts of life"—particularly the fact that "the rich nations are getting richer, while the poor nations struggle to improve the lot of their people." Since U.S. ground troops may be called in to settle any number of disputes arising from this basic contradiction, the Army has been preparing to fight in a great variety of "environmental extremes"—the Himalayas, the Sahara, the Arctic, etc.—and in urban as well as rural settings.

In the mid-1960s, Army laboratories staged many training exercises designed to develop combat doctrine for counterinsurgency warfare in a tropical jungle environment. Special maneuver areas were set aside in the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico and the Southeastern United States, where conditions approximate those in Southeast Asia. An astute observer, if any were present at those exercises, would have been able to visualize much of the subsequent fighting in Indochina.

With that in mind, it behooves us to pay special attention to recent training exercises in desert settings. One such was Operation Alkali Canyon 73, held in California's Mojave Desert in August 1973. According to Pentagon officials, Alkali Canyon called for a 9,000-man Marine landing force to "repel invaders and preserve American lives and property" when an invented desert nation, Argos, is invaded by the Soviet-armed Yarmonians. Although Pentagon spokesmen refused to provide further details, there was no doubt in the minds of newsmen that the exercise signaled Pentagon preparation for combat in the Middle East. "There is where U.S. oil interests are great and becoming more vital as the nation's appetite for fuels outruns is supplies," *U.S. News & World Report* observed in its August 27, 1973 issue. Significantly, many of the units taking part in the exercise were from the 2nd Marine Division, which supplies troops for U.S. forces in the Mediterranean. Also revealing is the fact that the mock "aggressors" wore khaki shirts and red collar insignia similar to those worn



Oliphant, The Denver Post

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by the Libyan Army. There can be little doubt that the lessons learned in Alkali Canyon 73 would be put to use in actual combat operations should U.S. troops ever intervene in the Middle East.

"If we are to accomplish our many diverse tasks," General Westmoreland explained in 1971, "we must do better with less. . . . For that reason, we seek a leaner, more versatile Army, equipped with the most modern and effective weapons and manned by motivated, well-trained soldiers." A smaller army, General Abrams told Congress in 1973, "will not be able to match potential enemies man-for-man and weapon-for-weapon in many likely areas of deployment. We cannot afford an army large enough to do that, nor can we recruit such an army." What we need, he asserted, "is the *qualitative edge* that will provide our smaller forces with the combat advantage necessary to insure success." (Emphasis added.) This qualitative edge can be attained, in the view of most Defense planners, only if the Army acquires a much higher ratio of combat firepower to manpower. The new emphasis on technology, which is considered essential to the success of an all-volunteer army, is summarized by some officers in the slogan "Firepower—not manpower."

Various components of the machine-oriented New Action Army are now undergoing operational testing and evaluation at selected Army combat laboratories. At Fort Monmouth, N.J., for instance, the Army Electronics Command is testing a new concept in battlefield surveillance —the use of sensor-equipped "remotely piloted vehicles" (RPVs) to scan the battlefield for enemy positions. The RPVs are small unmanned aircraft, or drones, controlled by radio from the ground. According to General Abrams, "the drone would carry television cameras and infrared sensors which can be monitored at a ground station. Once a target was identified, personnel at the ground station would be able to activate on-board lasers to illuminate targets for attack by laser-guided ['smart'] weapons."

The Army is also concentrating on techniques for increasing the "kill probability" of existing systems, the objective being to achieve "first round kill certainty"—i.e., the expectation that every bullet, shell or missile fired will hit its intended target and do a thorough job of incapacitation. In the area of small arms, Army scientists are working on new types of ammunition that would mean certain death, no matter what part of an enemy's body was hit. Thus consideration is being given to rifles that fire *"fléchettes,"* small, very high-velocity darts that would literally tear a human body to pieces. And in the area of tube artillery and missiles, the emphasis is on "terminal homing" devices that can steer a shell to its intended target with pinpoint accuracy. Such projectiles—the Army has named them "smart rounds," after the "smart bombs" used in the air war against North Vietnam—would carry a sensor device (infrared or electromagnetic) which could "lock on" to a target by "reading" its "signature," and correct the trajectory of a shell so that it lands on target. Other proposed smart rounds will "home in" on light beams bounced off the target by a laser gun or "target designator." Terminal homing systems, according to one Army enthusiast, "could produce a quantum jump in cost-effective combat power and a major, perhaps revolutionary, change in tactical concepts and organization."

Laser-guided weapons and associated hardware were subjected to intensive testing during a unique exercise of the "Small Independent Action Force" (SIAF) team in 1971. The SIAF units, consisting of six-man Special Forces teams, were sent on simulated missions behind enemy lines to pinpoint key targets for Air Force bombers and gunships. Each team was equipped with survival rations, radio position indicators and a Laser Target Designator (LTD). The whole operation, conducted in California's rugged Los Padres Mountains, was monitored around the clock by computer "listening posts" at the Army's Combat Developments Experimentation Command, Hunter Liggett Military Reservation, California. The computer data were then used to verify mathematical models of small-unit operations that had been devised by TRW, Inc. on the basis of Green Beret reconnaissance missions along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. The SIAF exercise, a part of the Pentagon's top-secret Project Agile, will be used to develop the optimal "man/machine system" for future Special Forces operations in remote areas of the Third World.

On a larger scale are the elaborate TRICAP tests at Fort Hood, involving considerably more than 10,000 servicemen and support personnel. The TRICAP Division, according to current plans, will consist of three principal units—an armored brigade, an airmobile brigade and an air cavalry combat brigade (ACCB). Of these, the ACCB is the most innovative: each air cavalry task force will be composed of several "hunter-killer" teams (known as BHATs or basic helicopter attack teams) made up of small scout helicopters and missile-armed attack helicopters. In the scenarios of projected TRICAP operations, the ACCB's hunter-killers will seek out and destroy the enemy's advance tank forces, while the airmobile infantry forces (armed with anti-tank missiles) will provide a mobile defense on the ground until the division's armored brigade can move up for the counter-offensive. Inherent in the TRICAP concept is the use of new battlefield computers and surveillance systems still being developed. "You just can't visualize the TRICAP division as being on yesterday's battlefield," General Norton asserted. "We have too many exciting improvements that are already on the way [including] greatly improved systems for intelligence, logistics, and command and control, based upon exploitation of space vehicles, new sensors, and automation technologies."

All of the concepts and technologies that comprise the New Action Army were brought together at Fort Hood in March 1972 for Operation Gallant Hand 72, the largest in a series of annual exercises with that name. Involving some 23,000 servicemen from thirty-five separate Army and Air Force commands, Gallant Hand 72 was designed "to hone the skills and develop the techniques necessary for a large armed force to be moved long distances and maintain its ability to quickly assault." According to the scenario released by Pentagon officials, the exercise called for home-based troops to be airlifted by Air Force jets to the nation of Marcos, a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mythical overseas ally which had been invaded by its northern neighbor, Lobos. While "Marcos" suggests our very real (and very threatened) ally President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, the "mid-intensity" scenario for Gallant Hand and the heavy equipment employed (tanks, gunships, artillery, fighter-bombers, etc.) indicate a locale in southeastern Europe or the Middle East, where potential adversaries would be armed with the most modern Soviet armaments. Indeed, Gallant Hand suggests the ideal Pentagon model for future U.S. interventions in such countries as Israel, Turkey, Iran or Greece: U.S. expeditionary forces begin landing in Marcos within hours of the enemy invasion; when sufficient heavy equipment is flown in on giant C-5A transport jets, the allied forces mount a devastating counterattack on the invading army using the new arms described above. After a few days of intense combat (and perhaps a brief trip to the capital for a "victory parade," as in Deep Furrow), the American troops are recalled to their bases in the United States—long before the public or Congress has a chance to mobilize any significant opposition to the operation.

At the conclusion of Gallant Hand 72, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Thomas Moorer told reporters: "After being in uniform for over forty years, I have heard the charge many times that we are preparing to fight the [last] war rather than the future war. But that is not true." Moorer pointed to the new technology and the new tactics—including the use of air cavalry anti-tank units—as evidence of a forward-looking approach to defense. Certainly Gallant Hand 72 indicates that Army planners have come a long way from Vietnam, with its emphasis on prolonged manpower-intensive ground operations. It, and the other exercises described above, suggest that the Pentagon has adopted a new approach to ground operations abroad, one that is consistent with the Nixon Doctrine and with changing domestic and international political constraints. As we move into the mid-1970s, it is apparent that future U.S. military interventions abroad will conform to these basic guidelines:

¶The actual deployment of troops in future crises will conform more closely to U.S. economic priorities: Europe, Japan and the Middle East—with their vast concentration of industrial facilities and oil reserves—are more likely to host U.S. troops than the outlying regions of the Third World where American investment is minimal.

¶Once committed to battle, U.S. troops will use every advantage in firepower and technology to overwhelm hostile forces in a very short period of time—before any domestic or foreign protest movements can mature.

¶When hostilities are concluded, U.S. troops will be redeployed to the United States or to offshore naval facilities where they will be largely invisible to public view until activated for the next intervention.

These guidelines suggest that critics of American foreign policy will have to adopt a new approach in the struggle to prevent future U.S. interventions abroad. We cannot expect a repetition of Vietnam with its prolonged build-up and endless skirmishes—future interventions will likely be concluded long before protest leaders can organize a March on Washington or Fifth Avenue parade. Instead, it will be necessary to investigate every field exercise, every troop movement, for signs of impending hostilities. More research needs to be done, also, on the effect of changing world economic relationships on U.S. defense posture. Only continuous vigilance of this sort will permit the anti-interventionist forces to mobilize public opinion against future U.S. "police operations" *before* it is too late. □

OAK PARK TOES THE COLOR LINE

MICHAEL KIRKHORN

Chicago

Since the time when travelers followed a trail from Oak Park to Fort Dearborn, using a tall pine tree as a beacon, the village has always managed to keep the city at a safe distance. But now Chicago's black population has moved across the West Side to Oak Park's boundaries, and the residents there are responding by taking extraordinary and perhaps unconstitutional measures to escape engulfment by what one city official has called "the black tide."

These measures include invoking Oak Park's peculiar "exemption clause," which permits landlords, building managers or homeowners in designated neighborhoods to refuse to sell or rent to black families without worrying about prosecution by the village. The announced purpose of exemption is to sustain racial balance in situations where blacks threaten to become a large majority.

So far, the clause has been applied to only one block along South Austin Boulevard, which is the boundary between Chicago and Oak Park. The division is both municipal and symbolic: the east and west sides of the street are almost indistinguishable in the style and careful maintenance of the sturdy and spacious two- and three-flat houses and small apartment buildings. The sturdiness and spaciousness, in fact, explain why black families find the neighborhood so desirable—it is not a slum. Because the boundary is invisible, black Chicagoans do not feel they have trespassed when they choose to live west of South Austin rather than east; they have simply found a good place to live.

So black families have been moving into flats, apartments and houses along South Austin. And while the black population of Oak Park does not amount to much more than 2 per cent of the village's 63,000 residents, the 100 and 200 block of South Austin was, at last official count, more than 52 per cent black, with the balance shifting rapidly as black families moved into a remodeled

Michael Kirkhorn is on the staff of the Chicago Tribune, *to which he moved recently from the urban affairs desk of the* Milwaukee Journal.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

apartment building on the corner. The block houses Oak Park's largest concentration of black residents.

The official statements of the Oak Park Community Relations Commission, which may on its own authority declare exemption from the city housing ordinance, and other community leaders insist that Oak Park is not a place where people panic when blacks move in. Interviews along the street partly support this view, but a lot of people can be found who say they are leaving. Some of them had moved several times to get out of neighborhoods further east which have turned black; they felt safe in Oak Park.

"Living with the colored, I don't go for that," said one homemaker. "I don't intend to pay $225 for rent and live in a building with a colored family. . . . We're leaving as soon as my son graduates high school." Others living west of Austin say they feel no anxiety over racial change, but when they are asked whether they have black neighbors, they quite often know precisely where the newcomers live.

Until the South Austin experiment, the village's exemption clause had never been invoked, and it has never been tested in the courts. It was invoked because of the urgent demand for housing—and housing in safe neighborhoods with good schools—by black families.

The large corner apartment house on the exempted block has been a source of irritation for decades. "The kids would come out—and these were white kids, trash—and throw rocks at your house," a neighbor recalled. Persistent pressures from village officials, housing inspectors and the local block club led to a mortgage foreclosure and replacement of the building management. Residents were evicted and the apartments were remodeled. When these were put up for rent, "about 99 per cent of the applicants were black," said Karen Clawson, a white teacher and the chairman of the block club. She circulated a petition and wrote the application for exemption.

Though some members of the commission found exemption distasteful, the application was quickly approved. H. Kris Runnow, director of the commission, said anti-exemptionists on the commission considered this form of sanctioned racial discrimination to be the moral equivalent of Watergate, but most of the schemes which have been introduced across the country to admit a measured proportion of blacks into white neighborhoods have failed, and apparently nobody in Oak Park could think of an alternative. Neither could the village's governing body, the board of trustees. While some trustees disliked exemption, they were willing to go along with it as an experiment.

There is racial fear in Oak Park, which has always prided itself on its smugly traditional way of life, but the issue is not simply racial; it never is. Oak Park is only a short ride on the elevated train from the Loop. Much of its housing is old or, as village officials admit, "economically obsolete." Code enforcement and rehabilitation are major problems. In many ways the village resembles an older central city neighborhood more than it does a suburb. More than 20 per cent of its residents are more than 60 years of age. As they die or give up their homes, younger families move in. Many of these families will be black simply because the black population needs new communities in which to live. Chicago does not have enough good housing to accommodate them.

In Chicago's public schools 57.6 per cent are black and 29.5 per cent are white. This would indicate great pressure, as families are formed, for more and better housing. Chicago has elaborate schemes for reviving communities and building new ones in the city, but most of these remain schemes for the time being. The reality seems to be that white and black families who can afford to move (a growing number), continue to leave the city. Because many such blacks prefer to live near the established black community, it is logical that Oak Park should expect a great increase in the black population in the next ten or fifteen years.

Exemption has accentuated a number of conflicts in the South Austin block, which has only sixty-two housing units—apartments, flats or single-family homes. There is a division between tenants, considered by some to be irresponsible and therefore faintly menacing, and owners, many of whom must spend heavily to repair their old buildings. There is a division between members of the block club and residents who are not members.

Mrs. Lucilla Lofton, a black woman who bought a two-flat house to "escape the ghetto," resents the intrusion of the Community Relations Commission into her affairs: "We came here, we try to clean up, we try to fix up and we try to advance. . . . Let the people who want exemption take care of their own business and not bother me. . . ." Other residents, black and white, are indifferent; some didn't even know the meaning of the petition they signed.

Nobody can say what the effect of exemption will be. "We don't pretend it's a solution," Miss Clawson said. A few weeks after the South Austin block was declared exempt, trustee Robert Varnes proposed that the village enact an ordinance which would make it unlawful to sell or rent to a black person in designated blocks where the black population was 30 per cent or more. The ordinance was referred to the Community Relations Commission for study. Another trustee, Clifford Osborn, said the proposal was "certainly . . . a violation of the United States Constitution," but he said it also seemed to be a "reasonable and logical attempt to deal with historical trends."

One danger in imposing exemption is that it lends moral authority to those who simply want to keep blacks out. A few days after exemption was announced, a young black man came to the Community Relations Commission to complain indignantly that he had been refused an apartment in another part of the village by a building manager who said that by becoming the fourth black in a 15-apartment building, he would upset the racial balance.

State and federal officials and members of civil rights organizations are equally indignant about exemption, but no lawsuits have been filed and one may detect in the expressions of disapproval a note of resignation. After all, racial balance is an unobjectionable goal, but in the cities no way has been found to keep communities balanced for very long. People who could be expected to oppose the invoked exemption clause seem inclined instead to overlook it. Unchallenged, discrimination along South Austin Boulevard remains the law of Oak Park, if not of the land. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF OIL

CLAY STEINMAN and ROBERT ENTMAN

"A lot of ordinary people all over the country think it is time for us to find out who owns and runs America."
Sen. Lee Metcalf (D., Mont.)

Washington

The most visible effects of the energy crisis for most of us have been higher fuel prices, lower fuel supplies and reduced speed limits. The more foresighted writers in the corporate media note that the crisis is more fundamental: the resources which fueled the Industrial Revolution are expiring. "The age of cheap energy is over," they say, telling us that Americans—and mostly they seem to mean consumers—must check their wanton consumption of energy or face economic collapse and/or slow death by environmental poisoning.

So the current energy crisis signals more than the end of 40¢-a-gallon gas. What most people have apparently yet to recognize is that the malfunctioning of their vital energy supply system stems from a basic deficiency in the political process: American governmental institutions (let alone the American people) lack the power to insure a rational public energy policy.

Since control of energy production, transportation and distribution is in the private sector, it is hardly a surprise that almost everyone concerned with the issue sees the energy conglomerates as either heroes or villains. This focus on the conglomerates gives credence to the assumption that the energy companies have awesome power, whether it be the power to create shortages for their own private ends or the power to alleviate them through their own private efforts.

It *is* important to search for the immediate causes of the shortage and for immediate ways to mitigate its effects. But the more profound question is how any force, acting in the public interest under the present system, could exert any control at all, in the face of the insurmountable barrier of concentrated economic resources and technological expertise erected by the oil companies.

Although the oil industry is widely considered the most powerful lobby in Washington, it does have its critics. At the time of the Senate capitulation on the Alaska pipe line measure, Sen. Floyd Haskell (D., Colo.), a fairly strong environmentalist and an advocate of the Canadian pipe line alternative, introduced an amendment which would have forced the oil companies out of the pipe line and transportation business after five years. Sen. Henry Jackson (D., Wash.), chairman of the committee which reported the Alaska pipe line bill, persuaded Haskell to let the amendment drop. In return, Jackson advised Haskell to introduce the measure as a separate bill and promised him chairmanship of a special subcommittee on integrated oil operations. The hearings, which Haskell says are exploratory rather than legislative, began November 28.

During the first seven days of testimony (more are expected in 1974), oil industry representatives and government and academic apologists and critics concentrated on the relationship between the structure of the oil industry, governmental action and the energy crisis. The oil people and their defenders predictably blamed the energy shortage on what they said was excessive government regulation, particularly in the areas of environmental regulations and price controls. Like their critics, most oil interest representatives said the Middle East embargo, rather than causing the crisis, had simply brought it on sooner than expected.

Critics of the industry noted, however, that the shortage's effects on recent public policy closely followed the companies' long-professed goals. The Alaska pipe line has been approved; environmental regulations have been relaxed; the pressure on Congress for deregulation of natural gas prices is intense and mounting. And, as Jesse M. Calhoon of the National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association testified, "Most of the debate on the energy crisis is now proceeding on the unchallenged and unscrutinized assumption that the oil companies need greater incentives to increase domestic production." Calhoon argued that, having created domestic shortages, the oil companies are using them "to try to convince the American people that incentives for new exploration and/or expansion of production can only be provided through higher prices for oil products, higher profits for the industry and greater tax benefits."

Implicit in Calhoon's analysis is the belief that the oil companies share a community of interest rather than an arena of conflict. On that point, Robert Killian, Attorney General of Connecticut, testified bluntly: "There is no competition in the petroleum industry." Other witnesses supported Killian's contention, detailing various anti-competitive aspects of the industry. Rep. George E. Brown, Jr. (D., Calif.) listed large numbers of joint ventures among major oil companies. Texaco alone, he said, owns joint drilling leases with eight major and several smaller firms; the company also has many partnership arrangements with oil and gas producers in joint foreign ventures. Domestically, Texaco cooperates with other producers in major interstate pipe-line operations.

Citing a study commissioned by his organization of such cooperative practices in the industry, Calhoon pointed out that the joint ventures provide opportunities for "exchange of information, discussion of marketing priorities, perhaps some production planning, and perhaps a general forum in which a climate of unanimity with respect to such problems as scarcity, prices, political associations and other pertinent affairs can be developed."

Calhoon, Sen. Lee Metcalf and others stressed the significance of interlocking directorates as another anti-competitive force. Calhoon said, "A network of fourteen banks was tied to eighteen of the largest oil companies. For example, Exxon has interlocking directors with Chase Manhattan, Morgan Guaranty and the Chemical banks.

Clay Steinman is on the staff of the Capitol Hill News Service in Washington, D.C. Robert Entman is a doctoral candidate in political science at Yale University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These three banks interlock with Atlantic Richfield, Standard of Indiana, Diamond Shamrock, Cities Service, Continental Oil, Amerada Hess, Mobil, and Texaco. This pattern is repeated again and again."

Metcalf noted that the top stockholder in Atlantic Richfield is the Chase Manhattan Bank; the same bank, he said, is also the second largest stockholder in Mobil. In each case Chase owns about 5 per cent of the stock —a percentage, Metcalf said, "often sufficient for control." The crisscross concentration of cooperative power in the oil industry seems undeniable.

The anti-competitive factors, government tax preferences—particularly the oil depletion allowance and the foreign tax credit—and especially the vertically integrated structure of the giant energy combines have caused the industry to concentrate its profit making at the crude oil level. As companies which control the energy business from the ground to the buyer, oil corporations essentially buy crude oil from themselves at inflated prices and then sell their products at high, very profitable prices based on their self-set costs.

Also, since some time in the 1960s, government policies, the drop in known domestic oil reserves, and the abundant and cheap supply of Middle East oil evidently have encouraged the industry increasingly to expand its production interests in foreign areas. As Dr. John Blair of the University of South Florida testified, American-owned international companies have been consistently making more profits than the companies which operate mostly at home. At the same time, the majors have been moving away from domestic crude production and into foreign operations; they have virtually ceased construction of domestic refineries even though domestic demand is rapidly increasing.

Prof. James Patterson of Indiana University puts it this way: "A small group of businessmen could, and did, decide to let gasoline demand catch up with refining capacity in the United States while expanding refining capacity at a breakneck rate over the rest of the world."

Virtually all the critics at the hearings contended that the shortages *were* produced deliberately by the majors. They maintained that the lack of competition among the oil companies and their vertically integrated structures made such duplicity both feasible and profitable. And they insisted that restoring competition at each of the stages of operation could prevent such policies in the future.

It is competition—despite their free enterprise rhetoric —which the major companies apparently fear most, and act most diligently to prevent. Professor Patterson said the domestic refining lag was engineered because "more gasoline was being produced than could be marketed through controlled, national branded outlets. This resulted in a general weakening of prices and a rapid growth of independent marketers. . . ." These independents were gaining an increasing share of the market and actually giving the majors price competition.

Patterson calls competition between a major brand station and an independent, discount dealer "intertype competition." Only this kind of price competition can keep consumer prices down. What Patterson calls intratype competition, say between Exxon and Shell, leads to the kind of nonprice competition typical in America's consumer product industries. It becomes a matter of brand image, gimmickry, advertising promotions and the like. As Patterson points out, the costs of such "competition," far from making fuel cheaper, "end up as permanent additions to marketing costs, which all customers must bear. The ultimate result of intratype competition is the destruction of price competition . . . the final conclusion of the process is cooperation." And, as indicated above, the majors do a considerable amount of cooperating.

The most recent example of concerted company action against the interests of the consumer has been the deliberate production of shortages, with several major results at the retail marketing level. According to Charles Binsted, president of the National Congress of Petroleum Retailers, "the nonbranded independents have already been eliminated as a significant source of competition." Binsted also testified that the independent owners of major brand stations "are next." The major oil corporations, he said, are beginning to market secondary brands —Exxon has already opened Alert stations—and are forcing their primary brand dealers to become salaried employees rather than independent, franchised businessmen.

At the same time, Binsted said, majors are consolidating marketing territories, carving up regions as if they were fiefdoms, pulling out of some sections of the country and concentrating their marketing efforts in others. Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, Standard of Indiana, Atlantic Richfield, Phillips, and British Petroleum are among the companies reported to be involved in one or more of the activities Binsted described. As a result, he said, "only three or four competitors [will be] operating all of the retail outlets in that area. The same cooperation that the majors have exhibited at the production and refining levels will then be applied to the retail level." Higher prices will follow.

While many of the critics came into the hearings with lists of figures and pages of charts, Randall Meyer, president of Exxon, testified as if his word alone were enough to sway the subcommittee. Meyer's response to charges of anti-competitive tendencies within the industry was simple: "The nation's present energy problems are in no way related to the structure of the industry or to a lack of competition. From my vantage point, I can assure you that the industry is extremely competitive." Not surprisingly, he blamed the shortage on such public policy measures as price controls and environmental regulations. He defended vertical integration and cooperation as having helped bring the consumer "a high quality product plus associated services he wants at the lowest possible prices." Meyer said that "the current situation has resulted from a sequence of events which occurred during the past twenty years as a direct result of public policies." Though he draws the wrong conclusions, his premise is probably right.

While Meyer and his colleagues complain about two decades of government action in regard to oil, the plain fact is that those government decisions have put

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the oil industry into its present lavishly profitable, increasingly monopolistic position. The current Administration certainly made no change of direction. Connecticut Attorney General Killian said that the antitrust division of the Department of Justice has "woefully failed to do its assigned job of antitrust prosecution. . . . The Federal Trade Commission not only lacks support from the Justice Department but has encountered opposition from the highest levels of the Administration." Yet Bruce Wilson, deputy assistant attorney general of the antitrust division, testified that "there has been no lack of antitrust enforcement with respect to the oil industry. Indeed this is an area to which both the antitrust division and the FTC have devoted a great deal of resources."

It is instructive to place this assertion alongside the testimony of Mark Green of the Corporate Accountability Research Group. He pointed out that the antitrust division and the FTC antitrust unit have a combined total annual budget of approximately $22 million—just about the amount that IBM alone spent for its defense in its recent monopoly suit. Further, Wilson's testimony revealed a distinct lack of commitment on his part to enforce antitrust laws with the resources he does have. Discussing his policy on vertical acquisitions, he said: "The committee may be assured that we intend to investigate such acquisitions, although we look forward to the day when artificial stimuli to vertical mergers are diminished as price controls are dismantled." His comments parroted the oil industry line, ignoring the fact that there have been broad price controls for only the last two years.

But even if Wilson were replaced by an ardent trustbuster, antitrust suits might not be successful. Harvard Law Prof. Stephen Breyer testified that suits to undo vertical integration would not likely be sustained by the courts because they are too "radical" a remedy, requiring vast changes in the methods of operation of the oil companies, and because the precedent that would be established by successful suits in the area could give the FTC "the power to restructure much of American industry."

Legislatively, as was revealed by just the sampling of information offered in the hearings, the complexity of the situation and the oil companies' control over data about themselves make it extremely difficult for a conscientious member of Congress to act in the public interest on these issues with certainty and dispatch.

Congress is filled with oil company lobbyists on the payrolls of the companies and, in the case of many oil-state legislators, of the taxpayers, ready to define the situation and distort the information to fit their limited visions and interests. Thus Haskell's divestiture bill—which would effectively break up the vertically integrated structure of the industry—isn't given much of a chance by anyone but Haskell, and he admits the great strength of the oiligarchs in Congress.

Two key impressions emerge from reading the testimony at the hearings. First, no one offered any fundamental solutions to the problems discussed. Divestiture is unlikely without a reversal in consciousness among members of Congress. Just as important, it is difficult to envision application of a divestiture law. There are plausible arguments that the inevitably costly and complex process of divestiture could actually work against the consumer



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interest, besides failing to address the problems of allocation and control.

Second, almost everyone testifying cloaked his analysis in the flag of free enterprise mythology. Restoration of competition was universally offered as the panacea. Despite historical evidence that it doesn't necessarily meet consumer needs, the old invisible hand is still viewed as the ultimate solution to the industry's flaws and the nation's energy problems. Even Adam Smith wrote that the unfettered operation of free enterprise could have ruinous consequences in the absence of limitless abundance of resources; and fossil fuel resources are finite.

Yet within the conventional free market parameters, there seems no way to cure this situation. The industry is so powerful and vast that we may have come to the point where no reforms are adequate, where without deep, fundamental changes in our economic system, there is essentially nothing to do but allow the private sector greater power over public policy. One can argue that exactly that has been done: the oil companies have been allowed to decide how much fuel they will supply us and at what cost—and with little regard to rational current usage or prudent future planning.

Thus the independent power that seems to have accrued in America to capital concentration and technological expertise may have rendered independent, regulatory government a civics-book illusion. Congress holds hearings, but otherwise it seems ineffectual in the energy area. The Administration is closely allied with oil interests, and no previous administration could accurately be called anti-oil. Judicial remedies seem unlikely.

Perhaps, then, the oil executives and apologists are right when they say that the only way to get more oil for America under the present system is to pay the oil companies such an outrageously large ransom that they will respond by doing what they can to give the country all the fuel it wants. Although it was only hinted at during the hearings, this adds up to a compelling case for nationalizing the energy conglomerates, and putting the nation's energy resources and its international dealings for fuel under the rule of rational policy. Reformist regulation, as the oil executives point out, most likely would only further complicate an already massive, intricate industry.

Vertical integration in a *socialized* energy industry, it seems to us, could be benign. Without the temptations to increase profits through waste and artificially created demand, government-controlled industry could foster efficiency, simplifying problems of conservation, information, allocation and foreign relations, as everything was brought under one centralized management dedicated to rational planning.

Yet nationalization alone is not the final answer to the problem of concentrated industrial power over public policy; nationalization under a Nixon type of administration would do more to generate problems of concentrated power than it would to solve them. The dilemma must be approached generically; the "crisis" in the oil sector is only the currently most visible manifestation of an overall structural flaw in the American political economy.

There's a basic unresolvable contradiction between the priorities of private capital and the needs of the society. The contradiction can't be resolved as long as the traditional individualistic ethic of enlightened self-interest continues to pervade political dialogue. As considerations of scarcity and ecology become increasingly important, it is increasingly irrelevant and even functionally malevolent to talk about an invisible hand protecting general social good. People still talk that way in Congress and in the Nixon Administration—and, as you would expect, they talk that way in oil company offices. □

AFTER COAL, STEEL

The Challenge of the Rank and File

WILLIAM KORNBLUM

There are ever increasing signs in America's blue-collar neighborhoods and factory zones that industrial unionism has entered a period of agonizing reappraisal of its directions and bitter struggles for leadership between the generations. Even in the United Mine Workers it is too soon to predict the final outcome of these convulsive outbursts of democratic competition, but it is quite clear that the courts and the Labor Department will play an ever more significant part in shaping labor politics in the 1970s. Most recent evidence for this statement comes from the vast Chicago and Gary District of the United Steelworkers of America.

In its most important decision since *Yablonski* vs. *United Mine Workers*, the U.S. Department of Labor has ordered the Steelworkers union to hold a new election for director of that union's largest region, the 130,000-member Chicago-Gary (Calumet) District 31. Citing a long list of violations in the conduct of the bitterly contested February 1973 election, in which Samuel Evett narrowly defeated Edward Sadlowski (by 1,536 votes out of 45,000 cast), the department has upheld Sadlowski's claim that he "won the vote but lost the count."

This ruling gives new impetus to the rank-and-file insurgency among District 31's Steelworkers. Led by Sadlowski, a 35-year-old staff official and former local union president, the insurgents believe that in a new election they can dismantle the apparatus of thirty years of

William Kornblum teaches sociology at the City University of New York Graduate School. His book, Blue Collar Community: Work and Politics in South Chicago, *will be published this fall by the University of Chicago Press.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

personal rule for Joe Germano, the former District Director whose retirement precipitated the struggle between Sadlowski and Sam Evett, Germano's appointed successor and his assistant since 1937. [See "Rank & File in Steel: Never a Kind Word for Abel" by George Bogdanich, *The Nation,* May 7, 1973.]

Although the Steelworkers' attorneys are appealing the ruling in the courts, it is now clear that the insurgency in 31 is another major round in the accelerating movement for new leadership in America's industrial unions. Further evidence of this is the presence of Joseph Rauh Jr., the attorney who represented the Mine Workers For Democracy, and who is now arguing Sadlowski's case against the Steelworkers union leadership. Rauh says, "This is a mini-Mine Workers case with even bigger implications for the future. Sadlowski has a terrific case and I'm convinced that as a leader he's at least as good as Arnold Miller." Rauh met Sadlowski after the contested election and agreed to represent his case in Washington. Now, in cooperation with Chip Yablonski and associates, he is guiding the case through Federal Court in the Western District of Pennyslvania.

Sadlowski's appeal to rank-and-file Steelworkers and professional crusaders alike arises from his tough-minded insight into the problems of contemporary labor, and a personal style steeped in the culture of blue-collar America. An autodidact and the third generation of his family from the mills of the region, Sadlowski rouses Steelworker audiences with impassioned but reasoned analysis of the labor movement's stagnation. He can also debate the scholarly points of his position in university seminars. His program generally emphasizes reform in union procedure to bring greater democracy and more worker control over union policy, including the right to vote on contracts negotiated in Washington, and industry-wide conferences in the District, where the workers will set policy and goals for upcoming negotiations. Seemingly simple proposals, they are nevertheless enough to brand Sadlowski a heretic in a union which regularly brings hundreds of local union officials to Washington to rubber-stamp the results of bargaining between the union's executive board and company negotiators.

The Steelworkers executives' support for Sadlowski's opponents threatens to erode union president I.W. Abel's hope of succeeding George Meany as president of the AFL-CIO. Although Abel was unopposed in last February's union election, eleven out of twenty-five directorships were contested and most independent candidates polled respectable votes. Especially damaging to Abel's reputation, however, is the evidence against his allies in the Calumet region. Among the offenses reported in the Labor Department's deposition against the Germano-Evett organization were irregularities in the reporting and counting of votes,

THE NATION

The 108-year-old magazine still ahead of its time. SUBSCRIBE NOW and save 40% of the newsstand price.

See Subscription Offer on Back Cover of This Issue



Edward Sadlowski

denial of Sadlowski's right to post observers at polling places, use of union funds for Evett's campaign, and campaign activities by union staff officials while on union business. In its formal complaint against the union, the Labor Department does not give the details, but by watching the recent activities of union locals in District 31, one can get a good idea of the strength of the department's case.

Before it will set aside a union election under the terms of the Landrum-Griffin Act, the department usually requires at least one instance of major fraud or equivalent flagrant election irregularity. Sadlowski and his Chicago attorney, the veteran labor advocate Leon Despres, immediately provided the department with a sheaf of depositions which detailed relatively serious offenses. The department discovered even more instances of fraud in its own investigation. For example, at the U.S. Steel Sheet and Tin Plant in Gary—where Sadlowski's election-day observer received a bomb threat and did not appear at the polls—the official tally showed a margin of approximately 900 votes for Evett against 200 for Sadlowski. Soon after these results were made public, as Labor Department investigators were beginning their inquiry into the conduct of the election, Evett approved the appointment of Daniel Cefalia, president of the tin mill local, to a high position on the union's staff. Shortly after this ap-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pointment, hundreds of Gary area Steelworkers testified that they had voted for Sadlowski and that their votes had been improperly tallied.

In early December, at a mass meeting of local union members, Cefalia and the other members of the union's election committee were suspended from union membership and fined a total of $4,000 for fraudulent conduct of the election. Almost three weeks after his suspension, Cefalia resigned his union staff position and Evett announced that the case was closed. Now, while attorneys for the union and the Labor Department present their versions of these events in the Federal Court of Western Pennsylvania, Sadlowski's insurgency seems to be gaining even greater rank-and-file support.

Even with such sensational issues as these, victory in a new election is by no means assured. In this era of Watergate penitence, the charges leveled against Evett and the incumbent union staff apparatus are indeed damning. But Evett still occupies the office, the Germano apparatus remains intact, and its leaders are prepared to fight for their political lives. Through court action, Steelworkers union lawyers are giving Evett time to collect a war chest and to consolidate the strength of his organization by maneuvering Sadlowski supporters out of influential positions in the District. One man, Ray O'Malley, in the Germano-Evett political apparatus in District 31, openly supported Sadlowski's candidacy. This highly respected union pioneer and CIO organizer on Chicago's West Side was summarily dispatched to the most distant and least influential corner of the District after the February election. This action served not only as a warning to other staff officials, but was also an attempt to shore up the union apparatus in the normally heavily machine-controlled West Side factories.

Less than 50 per cent of the membership in the Steelworkers union is employed in the blast furnaces, rolling mills and coke ovens of the basic steel industry. The majority of the labor force is concentrated in smaller specialty plants which fabricate raw steel into innumerable finished products, or produce millions of empty cans for the food industry, or convert by-products such as slag and ashes. In the Chicago-Gary area the majority of these workers are found in factories on the West Side of the city, in plants with fewer than 500 workers, that the union staff officials often refer to as "bucket shops." Here unionism has never been the intensely competitive political show that it is in the giant basic steel plants. Rather it has often involved the dispensing of petty favors similar to the pattern in machine precincts of the old "river wards." These are the factories which also employ the most recent arrivals to the city: Spanish-speaking Mexicans from the 18th Street area, blacks from the depressed West Side, and Southern whites from "uptown." This is also the segment of the industry which employs the greatest proportion of women, often in the least secure unskilled jobs. In return for "favors" from the staff official—such as aid in getting permission to leave the "line" to tend an ailing child at home—it has seemed of little consequence to give up one's vote in elections which have rarely been contested anyway.

In this traditional power base for Joseph Germano, where his organization could always offset losses elsewhere, Sadlowski shocked Chicago labor analysts by breaking even with the machine. But his organization of rank-and-file Steelworkers and local union officers will have to repeat this difficult performance again if they are finally to capture the directorship of District 31.

The big mills stretch in a massive phalanx along the lower basin of Lake Michigan, from South Chicago and Hammond to Gary and Burns Harbor, a distance of more than 30 miles. This enclosed world of the industrial worker develops its own unique political culture. In voting overwhelmingly for the insurgents, the big mills ran true to form, for here the workers jealously protect traditions of local democracy (and also at times, petty corruption) which date from well before the rise of the CIO. As Joe Haygood, vice president of the South Works Local 65 at U.S. Steel, and veteran civil rights leader, explained, "The people in the big mills have been itching for a chance to vote against the union establishment, but since Germano ran unopposed for so many years they never had the chance. You knew the rank and file weren't for Germano and Evett when it came time to vote for the union's executive board and we cast our votes in the opposite way from what Germano wanted. They never could get a majority in the big mills for Abel, for example, but they could always pick up the votes they needed in the bucket shops. I think that for the first time since the union was created we have changed the pattern."

As always, years of difficult organizing, years of nibbling away at the structure of personal allegiances which make up a political machine, is the key to success in an insurgency such as this one. Perhaps the most difficult obstacle to overcome is the workers' provincialism. Steelworking families along Division Street or Kedzie Avenue share the same needs and aspirations as those in South Chicago and Gary, but how to overcome the allegiances to local figures and the suspicion of campaign workers from other areas? Personality alone is not sufficient, for the best candidate in the world cannot reach workers hurrying home after a long day at the machines. The organizational weapon needed to break down the barriers of neighborhood loyalties and traditional allegiances is created through years of patient bull sessions at Peoria conventions; it is made by finding local leaders who share the progressive ideals of the movement; and it grows through endless appearances at the plant gates and in the neighborhoods. As Steelworker John Chico, Sadlowski's boyhood friend and a prominent Chicano leader, says: "We've been knocking at the door for so long, we've created an organization throughout the District. In every mill neighborhood, we've cut across all the racial and ethnic barriers, and finally, with this Labor Department decision we have our foot in the door."

And as word of a final, court-set date for the rerunning of "the election" is awaited impatiently by growing numbers in local union halls and Steelworkers' barrooms from Gary to North Chicago, there's substantial evidence to believe that more than just a foot has already been pushed through the once impregnable door in District 31, and that this news is being heard anxiously now in the executive offices of the International in Pittsburgh. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS & THE ARTS

'Open Up a Few Corpses'

THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC: An Archeology of Medical Perception. *By Michel Foucault. Translated from the French by A. M. Sheridan Smith. Pantheon Books. 215 pp. $8.95.*

MARGUERITE HOWE

In France, Michel Foucault is the intellectual of the hour. He has displaced Sartre, replaced the solemn Germanic pronouncements of existentialism with discourse in the tradition of Voltaire. Elegant, arrogant, razor-blade brilliant, Foucault nevertheless wears his learning lightly; he may be outrageous, but he is never dull. His following must consist largely of masochists, and those who can admire while they do not understand, for Foucault, though ultimately intelligible, is flamboyantly difficult. He is the soul of panache and perversity: more interested in turning a phrase or framing a paradox than in making himself understood, he succumbs with religious regularity to the urge to lead his reader around by the nose, and lets fly the same unmitigated aggression at most of Western philosophy—the efforts of his immediate predecessors in particular.

Foucault won his reputation as a brilliant historian of ideas with his first book, *Histoire de la folie* (1966), (*Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, 1966). The work documents the quite different perceptions of insanity peculiar to classical times, the Renaissance, and the modern period. The book also shows how a culture defines its limits—itself—by exclusion. (Any paraphrase of Foucault, alas, reduces an exquisite construction with unforgivable crudeness; one summarizes him as one "summarizes" a poem.) About *Madness and Civilization* one might complain that Foucault was too fond of abstraction, that the book had no human beings in it—least of all suffering madmen or lepers, for all these are transformed into cases or metaphors. (If Sartre looked bloodless before, he looks effusively Mediterranean now.) But even so, *Madness and Civilization* was stunning; we awaited its sequel eagerly.

Foucault's next book to be translated into English was not his second, but his third, *Les Mots et les choses* (1966), (*The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences*, 1970), and upon this shoal most English-speaking readers ran aground. *The Order of Things* boasts Gordian knots of the intellect that leave the reader giggling with exasperation. It does for the studies of life, language and money what *Madness and Civilization* did for insanity: that is, it shows how differently each age conceives of them. And Foucault makes the case for a crisis. Just as an epistemological crisis separated Renaissance from classical thought, and another split enlightenment epistemology from modern, so now a "mutation in discourse" is cutting us off from the past. "The Disappearance of Man," Foucault's controversial slogan, is a melodramatic, inexact rendering of the commonplace that we are at the end of the age of subjectivity. Since the 19th century, man has been subject and object of his own study, but man in this sense, Foucault argues, no longer exists. "It is comforting, and a source of profound relief to think that man is only a recent invention, a figure not two centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge, and that he will disappear again as soon as that knowledge has discovered a new form." Foucault is ambitious enough to engineer an apocalypse: it has been given to some, he implies—notably French structuralists—to see modern epistemology for what it is, precisely because they are no longer of it. Their "post-modern" perspective—which Foucault, in his enthusiasm, may have confused with a state of grace—enables them to ring in the new. ("I am restoring to our silent and apparently immobile soil," Foucault writes in a characteristically geographical metaphor, "its rifts, its instability, its flaws; and it is the same ground that is once more stirring under our feet.") After the coming epistemological earthquake, we infer, will come—in plain English—the age of structuralism.

Foucault's position, which he ever studiously avoids stating intelligibly, is partly a rebellion against inherited philosophical tradition. If Sartre's phenomenology, for example, stresses method, freedom, reasoned choice, individual judgment in a historical context—is, in short, a prescriptive egocentric humanism—then Foucault will reject the phenomenological approach, "which gives absolute priority to the observing subject, which attributes a constituent role to an act, which places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity." He will create instead an ahistorical, deterministic, amoral nonphilosophy, which—most ambitious of all—dispenses with that passé item of philosophical baggage, the human being.

"Scientific discourse" (the only thing Foucault has found worth studying) "should in the last resort be subject, not to a theory of the knowing subject, but rather to a theory of discursive practice." Which theory turns out to be a study of linguistic and epistemological structures. With customary perversity Foucault insists that he is not a structuralist, but the label persists, justifiably, in sticking. In a previous volume he asks: "Is it not possible to make a structural analysis of discourses which would evade the fate of commentary [which presupposes a concrete reality to be translated into language] by supposing no remainder, nothing in excess of what has been said, but only the facts of its historical appearance? The facts of discourse would then have to be treated not as autonomous nuclei of multiple significations, but as events and functional segments gradually coming together to form a system. The meaning of a statement would be defined not by the treasure of intention that it might contain, revealing and concealing at the same time, but by the difference that articulates it upon other real or possible statements. . . . A systematic history of discourses [which is what Foucault is doing] would then become possible." The post-modern innovation is to isolate the structures of speech and thought in their absolute purity, in systems which (like language) are self-referring, self-contained. Epistemological crisis? That sturdy, well-worn position usually called idealism has reappeared, this time decked out as structural linguistics.

Foucault, the intellectual innovator, however, deserves to be taken seriously. His "archeological method" describes "an epistemological space specific to a particular period," reveals "a positive unconscious of knowledge; a level that eludes the consciousness of scientists and yet is part of scientific discourse . . . those rules of formation which were never formulated in their own right, but

---

Marguerite Howe teaches English at Hunter College, the City University of New York. She is now at work on a novel.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are to be found only in widely differing theories and concepts and objects of study." Archaeology is a kind of cultural psychoanalysis: through the study of dreams or texts the analyst or archaeologist outlines the structure of a neurosis or epistemological field buried beyond conscious knowledge. Archaeology, unlike history, is "discontinuous" and sees time as vertical slices rather than horizontal flow. Foucault rejects Hegel's historical dialectic flatly, maintaining that 19th-century economics and linguistics can explain more about 19th-century biology than 18th-century natural science can. This time-slice (*"epistemé"*) is like Kuhn's scientific paradigm, and Polanyi's consensus of tacit knowledge.

Though carefully wrapped in new jargon, Foucault's ideas are neither new nor difficult. He is, to put it diplomatically, an efficient syncretizer; a little Nietzsche, Husserl, Lévi-Strauss is equipment enough. Yet *The Order of Things* is rough terrain indeed; it consists mainly of abstractions on abstractions (*"rarefaction,"* Foucault calls it). Customarily he proposes an abstraction, then makes other abstractions on that. But sometimes he omits the first abstraction, and makes abstractions on it anyway, or slips it in in disguise, or in a transition or—his favorite—withholds it till the end of his exposition. By such pitiless indirection does he elaborate, for instance, his crucial concept of "anthropology," the study of man, in the last chapters of *The Order of Things*. "Man," he says, "in the analytic of finitude"—without explaining precisely what he means by *that*—"is a strange empirico-transcendental doublet, since he is a being such that knowledge will be attained in him of what makes all knowledge possible." Then, 2 pages later, "Man is a mode of being which accommodates that dimension—always open, never finally delimited, yet constantly traversed—which extends from a part of himself not reflected in a *cogito* to the act of thought by which he apprehends that part; and which, in the inverse direction, extends from that pure apprehension to the empirical clutter, the chaotic accumulation of contents, the weight of experiences constantly eluding themselves, the whole silent horizon of what is posited in the sandy stretches of non-thought." Only later does Foucault mention Husserl (in passing, to dismiss him), which is like offhandedly flipping the reader a live grenade: Husserl makes most of the previous chapter leap suddenly into intelligibility:

> It may seem that phenomenology has effected a union between the Cartesian theme of the *cogito* and the transcendental motif that Kant derived from Hume's critique; according to this view, Husserl has revived the deepest vocation of the Western *ratio*, bending it back upon itself in a reflection which is a radicalization of pure philosophy and a basis for the possibility of its own history. In fact, Husserl was able to effect this union only in so far as transcendental analysis had changed its point of application (the latter had shifted from the possibility of a science of nature to the possibility of man to conceive of himself), and in so far as the *cogito* had modified its function (which is no longer to lead an apodictic existence, starting from a thought that affirms itself wherever it thinks, but to show how thought can elude itself and thus lead to a many-sided and proliferating interrogation concerning being). Phenomenology is therefore much less the resumption of an old rational goal of the West than the sensitive and precisely formulated acknowledgement of the great hiatus that occurred in the modern *epistemé* at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

That a concept so ill-defined as the appearance of man could be the same as anything so simple as Nietzsche's "anthropomorphism," the reader, left to excavate for himself, might never discover.

Yet to join in chastising Foucault for his style is to miss his point entirely. His fourth book, translated as *The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Method* (1970), analyzes the methods of interpretation he used in earlier books. Consummately abstract and involuted, it is itself an interpretation of an interpretation. It is an analysis of knowing and at the same time an example of it: Foucault is doing what he is talking about, and vice versa (an instance of "thought folding back on itself," as he is fond of saying). That Foucault clarifies his method as he uses it suggests an analogy between his work and Husserl's "methodological circle," the study that turns on itself, analyzes itself into consciousness, refines itself progressively. This is why it is unfortunate for English-speaking readers that Foucault's second book *La Naissance de la clinique* (1963), was translated out of order, and only recently at that, because *The Order of Things* and *The Archeology of Knowledge* have acquired a false hermeticism. Foucault has actually rewritten the same book three times, the same tripartite archaeology of madness, life, language, money, and now, in *La Naissance*, disease, each time reworking his subject to a greater degree of abstraction. This translation, *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception*, supplies the missing link between *Madness and Civilization* and the later books, and undoes their considerable tangles.

The Birth of the Clinic is a pleasure to read. Foucault, with the analytic enthusiasm of a born surgeon wielding a scalpel, addresses himself to the manner in which classical medicine, which saw transcendent diseases analyzed into a nosology of species and classes, gave way to the 19th-century positivist medicine of empirical observation, the "clinic." Of course Foucault is not writing about medicine so much as about epistemology. "This book," he warns us in the first line, "is about space, about language, and about death; it is about the act of seeing, the gaze." Space is the mental landscape of the "domain" (same as *epistemé*) of medical knowledge. Foucault, following deSaussure, is a three-dimensional thinker; he hypostatizes ideas and relationships into *things* that clutter his landscapes. For instance,

> the clinic appears—in terms of the doctor's experience—as a new outline of the perceptible and the statable: a new distribution of the discrete elements of corporal space (for example, the isolation of tissue—a functional, two dimensional area—in contrast with the functioning mass of the organ, constituting the paradox of an 'internal surface') a reorganization of the elements that make up the pathological phenomenon (a grammar of signs has replaced a botany of symptoms), a definition of the linear series of morbid events (as opposed to the table of nosological species), a welding of the disease onto the organism (the disappearance of the general morbid entities that grouped symptoms together in a single logical figure, and their replacement by a local status that situates the being of the disease with its causes and effects in a three-dimensional space).

There is a neat parallel in *The Birth of the Clinic* between body-disease-symptom and utterance-language-word (*enoncé, langue, parole*, as deSaussure has it), between one kind of "visible invisible" that "hides as it reveals," and the other. Foucault, being a structuralist, is fundamentally concerned with linguistics; changes in medicine only demonstrate how "the whole relationship of signifier to signified at the level of experience is redistributed" in language.

Medical perception is also "ontological," and one of Foucault's main points is that the modern age links, for the first time, death and the individual. This is the significance of autopsy in modern medicine: "from the integration of death into medical thought is born a medicine that is given as a science of the individual. And, generally speaking, the experience of individuality in modern culture is bound up with that of death." In an equation of sepulcher and subjectivity that has become *de rigueur* among structuralists, Foucault

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rhapsodizes: "Death left its old tragic heaven and became the lyrical core of man: his invisible truth, his visible secret." Is structuralism, then, out to deliver us from our mortality as well as our misconceptions? Foucault, who leaps shamelessly overboard at times like these, may be history's most hyperrational romantic.

In the end, his style is all. In *The Birth of the Clinic* we are present at an intellectual autopsy, "the sovereign dissection of language and the gaze," where the gaze of the doctor-archaeologist is a knife that analyzes "the common structure that carves up and articulates what is seen and what is said." To participate, "we must place ourselves and remain once and for all at the level of fundamental spatialization and verbalization of the pathological, where the loquacious gaze with which the doctor observes the poisonous heart of things is born and communes with itself." We participate in relating ideas, words, and things: "in every culture between use of what we might call the ordering codes of experience and the reflection of order upon itself there is a pure experience of order and its modes of being. The present study is an attempt to analyze that experience." This act of the mind turning back on itself is no different from Husserl's intentional analysis: mind reflecting on its unconscious knowledge, and thereby raising it to consciousness. It is clarification and formulation of "horizons" (Foucault and Husserl use the word), the limits that define the continuing coherence of a perceptual field. Foucault is, whether he approves of phenomenology or not, writing what amounts to the poetry of intentional analysis. His interior terrains are rarefied into reality where fact becomes irrelevant, things become irrelevant, where all that is left is an undulating mass of mind combining and recombining with itself, abstractions as objects, images with the purity of untrammeled inner representation. The irony is that Foucault, determined to transcend the individual, should end up writing a 192-page testament to analytic subjectivity.

It isn't hard to shoot Foucault's "post-modern" position full of holes. He rejects history, but falls victim to apocalyptic crisis psychology far cruder than Sartre's historicism. He rejects Hegel, but he is Hegelian: the gaze, man's continuing urge to make order and sense out of things, persists from one age to another, comes to knowledge of itself, which knowledge is of a higher and higher order, realizes itself—looks, in fact, suspiciously like (Foucault would shudder) Hegel's Mind. Even less respectable, the gaze behaves like a romantic "demiurge of knowledge" (Foucault's words). Yet in the last analysis it is Foucault's own gaze that makes him worth reading. He insists that we perform analytical calisthenics right along with him, so that we can understand how

> seeing consists in leaving to experience its greatest corporal opacity; the solidity, the obscurity, the density of things closed in upon themselves, have powers of truth that they owe not to light, but to the slowness of the gaze that passes over them, around them, and gradually into them, bringing them nothing more than its own light. The residence of truth in the dark centre of things is linked, paradoxically, to this sovereign power of the empirical gaze that turns their darkness into light. All light has passed over into the thin flame of the eye, which now flickers around solid objects and, in so doing, establishes their place and form. Rational discourse is based less on the geometry of light than on the insistent, impenetrable density of the object, for prior to all knowledge, the source, the domain, and the boundaries of experience can be found in its dark presence. The gaze is passively linked to the primary passivity that dedicates it to the endless task of absorbing experience in its entirety, and of mastering it. □

The Musician and His Times

MAHLER: A Biography. *By Henry-Louis de La Grange. Doubleday & Co. Vol. I. 982 pp. $17.50.*

DENNIS SANDERS

Music is a field with a long tradition of monumental biographies, with such pioneering works as Spitta's *Bach,* Jahn's *Mozart,* Thayer's *Beethoven,* and Newman's *Wagner* providing precedents of masterful scholarship and intellectual insight for later music biographers to follow. This first volume of a book devoted to the life and works of Gustav Mahler, by the French critic Henry-Louis de La Grange, does not measure up to the best standard biographies of composers, though it is comparable in size and detail.

The work aims at being definitive, a major compilation of data connected with Mahler's brief but busy career as conductor and symphonist *extraordinaire.* Volume I reconstructs the composer's life from his birth in 1860 to his marriage to Alma Schindler in 1902; the forthcoming second volume will cover events to Mahler's premature death in 1911. Mahler's daily life is precisely recounted, from his struggle to break from his bourgeois Moravian Jewish origins to his entry into the glittering (and anti-Semitic) world of German-Austrian music, from his controversial but eminently successful career as orchestra and opera conductor to his checkered career as composer and self-appointed musical visionary.

Mahler, like most figures born in this age of record keeping, left vast numbers of documents to be unearthed and assessed by his biographers, including opera archives, newspaper files, personal correspondence, and important personal reminiscences by his wife, Alma, by a life-long confidante, Natalie Bauer-Lechener, and by the late conductor Bruno Walter. La Grange's approach to this material is straightforward documentation, strictly chronological, even where a less rigid chronology might have brought out nuances in Mahler's character and

Dennis Sanders has done graduate work in musicology at Columbia University.

AUTOPSY ON PEOPLE'S WAR
CHALMERS JOHNSON

WHO won in Vietnam? What is "counter-insurgency?" What kinds of revolutionary strategies do terrorists and urban guerrillas pursue? Why has guerrilla warfare become the most commonly attempted form of revolution today? An experienced observer of Asia and revolutionary movements offers a post-Vietnam assessment of the revolutionary strategy known as people's war.

"Impressive as a reading of how foreign policy develops from domestic necessity."
— *Kirkus Reviews*

cloth, $5.75; paper, $2.25

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
Berkeley · Los Angeles · New York

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THROUGH THE BOROUGHS

I hear the music from the street
Every night. Sequestered at my desk,
My luminous hand finding the dark words.
Hard, very hard. And the music
From car radios is so effortless.
And so I strive to join my music
To that music. So that
The air will carry my voice down
The block, across the bridge,
Through the boroughs where people I love
Can hear my voice, saying to them
Through the music that their lives
Are speaking to them now, as mine to me.

Harvey Shapiro

activities. La Grange and his researchers have worked the mine of opera-company archives and newspaper files; what must be every extant anecdote, concert program, and review, favorable or otherwise, appears in the text. By compiling exhaustive data on the innumerable performances Mahler conducted, on who was involved on and off stage, and on what the critics had to say the following day, La Grange has unwittingly made Mahler's public life emerge much as the composer may have seen it—long, tedious, fraught with detail, and all too distant from his deeper interests at his composing desk.

In his portrait of Mahler the public figure, La Grange has focused in particular on his central position in the controversy which had grown out of a feud between followers of Wagner and Brahms a generation before. And he was not only up against a virulently anti-Semitic press which saw his compositions as Jewish subversion of German art but he was also caught up in a war of the buffoons, the battle between the so-called Classic and Romantic schools of conducting. Mahler, who had the knack of packing houses while irritating critics, became a somewhat reluctant champion of the Romantic school, giving highly colored, free interpretations to the works of Mozart, Beethoven, Weber and Wagner (his "touching up" of the orchestration of the Beethoven Ninth Symphony provoked a press scandal, though, as usual, Mahler's audiences found little fault with him).

During his lifetime, Mahler's personality was as much discussed as his conducting and composing. A moody, mercurial man with relentless drive and fierce artistic integrity, he pushed second-rate and even first-rate opera companies to despair in wringing the best possible performances from them, rebelling against authoritarian impresarios who blocked desired reforms or expenditures, forcing difficult singers into submission, and tirelessly working and reworking all details of staging, acting and music to insure that every performance under his baton met his exceptional standards. This concern with quality, coupled with the conviction that his ideas on style and interpretation were unquestionable, enabled Mahler to develop his manner of conducting quite without regard to the controversies raging about him. The critical battles and musical politics which plagued Mahler's public career were never more than external irritations; his inner musical course went on unperturbed.

The drive and integrity which earned Mahler the reputation of a martinet on the podium were directed inward in his composing. Despairing of gaining public recognition as a composer of importance when his conducting career met with immediate success, reduced to hearing only occasional or fragmentary performances of his works, and living for the summer vacations when he could compose in solitude at a country home, Mahler composed in and for his inner world. He believed his works were almost universally misunderstood, yet he refused to compromise what he considered his artistic mission.

If La Grange emphasizes the public side of Mahler beyond the influence it had in shaping his musical thinking, he does not adequately examine the composer Mahler as a child of his time. In his vast but intensely personal symphonic works, Mahler was expressing the *Zeitgeist*, in particular the atmosphere of the Vienna that held figures like Klimt, Schiele, Kokoshka, Schoenberg and Freud (Mahler knew many of these prominent Viennese and even consulted Freud in his later years). *Fin de siècle* Vienna was on the threshold of a new creative movement. The elements of early romanticism had been shaped into a highly developed eclecticism at the end of the century, and Vienna itself was about to give birth to expressionism and psychoanalysis. Though La Grange gives much attention to the social side of life in the Austrian capital, he almost totally ignores this intellectual ferment and its influence on Mahler, as well as his contribution to its spirit in his music. Mahler, after all, bridges the gap between Wagner and Schoenberg, and may in time prove to be the major transitional figure between the two. Although not an autobiographical tone painter like his friend and contemporary Richard Strauss, Mahler translated into music what might loosely be termed soul-states, with joy, sorrow, pessimism, humor, naïveté, sophistication, satire and spirituality all part of his expressive realm. This musical philosophy, which La Grange fails to take into account in terms of the culture in which Mahler practiced it, is crucial in assessing the composer.

Given the vast amount of documents, personal recollections, and musical sources available, La Grange had the option of sifting and synthesizing facts in building a three-dimensional portrait of the artist, or of assembling the material much as he has done and letting the man emerge from his life's evidence. La Grange opted for the latter, and has given us as factually complete a portrait of Mahler as is possible. The forces that shaped Mahler, and Mahler's shaping of his own, however, are too tentatively set forth to give as rich a portrait as he deserves.

Students of Mahler will appreciate the expanded chronology of the text, as well as the numerous appendices, which include family data, a catalogue of works (unfortunately omitting thematic *incipits*), extensive analyses of the works, poetry by Mahler and bibliography. A curious editorial decision has split the appendices chronologically so that analyses and poetry will appear in both volumes rather than in the last as is customary. The inclusion of Mahler's poems is most welcome (as would be a supplementary volume of complete letters). Mahler is an interesting if somewhat naive poet and, in the tradition of composers, a fascinating correspondent. The text, in translation from the original French, moves well in spite of its length and detail, although the editing has let in many minor inconsistencies. It is to be hoped that La Grange's main shortcoming as a biographer—his weakness in critically assessing the subject, his life and works in historical and cultural context—will be compensated for in a major concluding chapter in the forthcoming volume. In the meantime, Mahler, both man and music, remains a fascinating enigma. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Portfolio of Bad Dreams

MEN WITHOUT MASKS: Faces of Germany 1910-1938. *By August Sander. With an Introduction by Gunther Sander and foreword by Golo Mann. New York Graphic Society. 275 photographs in black and white gravure. 314 pp. $27.50.*

SANFORD SCHWARTZ

When connoisseurs put together lists of the great photographers, the name of the German August Sander is invariably there, along with Stieglitz, Evans, Cartier-Bresson, Atget, Kertész, Strand and Weston. Outside Germany, though, August Sander (1876-1964) has for long been more speculated about than known. *Men Without Masks* is the first extensive survey of his work we've had. There are 275 pictures here, most of them portraits. They, in turn, are a selection from a much larger collection of portraits, the chief project of Sander's life: his grandly conceived, only partially completed "People of the 20th Century." Sander worked primarily in Cologne and the farming regions around it, and yet he believed all of post-World War I German society was his province. For him, the point of the portraits was to depict every "type" and "archetype" of his time. Few photographers have had such high ambitions. And the portraits he took, whether or not they tell us what "archetypes" are, are among the most powerful and disturbing in all photography. *Men Without Masks* is like a portfolio of bad dreams.

Now that so much of Sander is at last available, one can express some reservations about his achievement. The conception he worked with seems pretentious, and he has a penchant for demonstrating his points with a heavy hand. His design has a built-in monotony, and Sander, a dogmatic sensibility, an artist who half believed himself to be a historian, did nothing to relieve that monotony. But none of this negates the force of the individual pictures. *Men Without Masks* is one of the small but rapidly growing number of essential books of modern photography.

German art often appears to be more about life and its problems than about art and *its* problems. This is especially true with portraiture. From Dürer on, German artists attain a spiritual and psychological expressiveness in this genre that no other national school gets near (or wants). Sander comes at the tail end of this tradition. Looking at his work, it's natural to think about him in relation to the painters who also recorded the faces of Weimar, and it is significant that his personal background is similar to the backgrounds of two of the most important of them, Lovis Corinth and Max Beckmann. Corinth, Beckmann and Sander all grew up under the influence of Romantic, late-19th-century German culture; they thought in terms of grandly operatic projects and regarded themselves as heroic creators (their heroes were painters like Delacroix and Rembrandt). All three became commanding, original artists only when they broke through their 19th-century outlook, and were able to revise their youthful goals in a way that took account of the far from heroic German society of the post-Kaiser years.

Sander's photography is "modern" in its terse straightforwardness; it is distinguished by a stark, nightmarish simplicity. He suggests the psychological tension and sense of menace that lie beneath the surface in anonymous personalities that seem, outwardly, pompous or reasonably self-assured, cocky or a

Sanford Schwartz has written on art for this magazine and for Art International.

BACK-TO-SCHOOL Subscriptions

For that special student or teacher in your life
—a Gift Subscription that is right on target.

20 Issues for only $5.00 !!

20 Issues of The NATION represents an entire semester of source material — ideal for:

- Research projects
- Curriculum planning
- Term papers
- Class discussion
- Rap sessions

The NATION, 333 Sixth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10014

Here's my $5.00. Send Gift Sub to:

Name _____

Address _____

City/State _____ Zip _____

School Affiliation _____

Starting date _____

How shall we sign the Gift Card? _____

X 1-26-74

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

little nervous. His cool, distant style has the same impact for us now as Corinth's feverish touch, or Beckmann's deliberate coarseness—it convinces us that the Weimar period was a brutal, anxious and frightening time in which to live.

Sander's Germany between the wars has a different kind of tenseness than anything that we are familiar with from the novels and plays, paintings and movies of the period. We are used to Weimar as an Expressionist melodrama, and Sander refuses to be melodramatic. There are no special effects of light or angle; his mug-shot style monumentalizes the sitters, and also petrifies them. He photographs everyone—jurists, clerks, beggars, bankers, soldiers, self-conscious decadents, industrialists, crippled veterans, gypsies, merchants—in the same manner, and all those solemn faces create a creepy, disquieting mood. The Weimar we draw from Sander's many individual portraits is a society whose chaotically diverse classes and types have come to a nervous agreement not to notice the behavior of any of its members. Sander's analytical, immobilizing approach makes the era look and feel more like a pressure cooker than it ever did before.

Very few of the masters of modern photography are known for their wit; it is surprising how grim they are as a group. August Sander outdistances everybody, however, in his avoidance of the least hint of playfulness, the slightest trace of irony. His approach was predetermined—he shot people the way lepidopterists pin butterflies on a board. He never made his subjects heroic, he never joked with them. Probably because his mind was always on the grand design, he never allowed people, with their peculiar quirks and rhythms, to come out and seize *him*. There isn't one picture in the book that makes one feel about the photographer, "he was taken by surprise."

With some great photographers it is possible to infer from the work a large, informing view of culture. But with Sander there are no preferences to be discerned, there is no approval or disapproval. His "point of view" is the same for left-wing activists, Nazis or Weimar Socialists. This is baffling at first, but then it begins to feel appropriate. It is one of the mysterious powers of photography that scrupulously impartial realism like this takes on the weight of a moral force—though one can't say what that force represents.

Sander wrote, "it is not my intention either to criticize or to describe these people, but to create a piece of history with my pictures." The formula crystallizes the view he worked from, a mixture of great naïveté and presumption. Dreiser exhibits the same combination of honesty and pomposity. Like Dreiser, Sander can be excessively appreciative, even pious, when it comes to the facts of the real world. He's convinced that they count; he believes that just preserving enough of them will tell an important story, and his conviction is so strong that it creates its own kind of clarity and rightness. Sander had Dreiser's kind of impure grandeur too. One accepts the inflexible, insensitive and calculating elements in his art because they are inseparable from the real qualities. Sander made his own time monumental, and he preserved all the anxious currents that ran beneath that monumentality. He didn't "create a piece of history" but he did "describe" his contemporaries, and that, though he might not have thought so, was achievement enough. □

Out of the Mouths of Babes

EDWIN MULLHOUSE: The Life and Death of an American Writer, 1943-1954 by Jeffrey Cartwright. *By Steven Millhauser. Alfred A. Knopf. 305 pp. $6.95. Paper $1.25.*

RONALD DE FEO

Writing a story about childhood and telling it from a child's point of view is a very tricky business. The writer is required to confine himself to the child's limited mental world. If he strays too far beyond that world, allows his child-protagonist to respond with a certain degree of maturity, to formulate complex thoughts, then the child loses his credibility as an innocent. If, on the other hand, the writer does not stray at all but keeps his character average and unremarkable, he may lose the reader. Lengthy, serious novels set entirely in childhood and told from a child's point of view are quite rare. Successful novels of this kind are rarer still. *Edwin Mullhouse*, a first novel by Steven Millhauser, cannot qualify as a total success, but Mr. Millhauser courageously confronts and to some extent overcomes the problems usually associated with the novel of childhood, so that one would have to look hard in order to find a book of this quality in its class.

Millhauser casts his novel as a literary biography. Jeffrey Cartwright, an 11-year-old, is the author of this minutely detailed biography of Edwin Mullhouse (six months Jeffrey's junior) who, before his untimely death at 11, wrote a supposedly remarkable novel, *Cartoons*. Of course, the reader must suspend his disbelief to accept the situation. Jeffrey has an extensive vocabulary and uses language like a master. He is a most atypical boy, infinitely more extraordinary than the presumed genius he hopes to immortalize. Despite Jeffrey's surprising command of the language and his sophisticated images and ideas, he keeps his innocence—his vision of the world as a place of wonder, mystery and surprise. His descriptions reflect a child's concern with his still fresh and living environment:

> . . . by 1:30 a dark thunderhead had spread over half the sky like a seeping stain. Edwin loved days like that: inside, the high hanging lights were on, shedding over everyone a rich warm intimate yellow glow, while outside, like a piece of bromide paper in a pan of developer, the bright sky darkened into the storm. Through the windows you could see paper bags and scraps of waxpaper tumbling across the deserted playground. The pale willow, drained of color, rippled like a curtain. The class was restless, waiting for the rain; heads at tables kept rising from workbooks to look out at the sky, and it was all Mrs. Cadwallader could do to keep the attention of the top reading group.

For a narrator, then, we have a child-adult, a creature who can interest us with his accomplished prose, yet who is enough of a child to make us believe that in him we have a very special, expert guide on the tour through childhood. His world seems all the more vivid and true because it is seen close up and not from a distance.

Although the book is supposed to be a biography and is divided into three "significant" periods (the Early, Middle and Late Years), the exhaustive biographical detail does not much further our understanding of Edwin the artist. We come to understand that Jeffrey cannot really trace the growth of Edwin's artistic awareness and sensitivity because Edwin did not possess those talents. Though Jeffrey pretends to admire Edwin's genius, he often hints at how annoyed he was by his subject's lack of intellectual curiosity. Concerning Edwin's 5th birthday, Jeffrey observes, "I gave him a magnificent two-volume *Child's*

Ronald De Feo has published criticism in The National Review, Commonweal, Modern Occasions, Saturday Review *and* The Nation, *and short stories in various literary magazines.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

History of the World, which he opened upside down and pretended to read eagerly for two seconds." The reader realizes that Edwin the artist is not really the subject of this book. It is Edwin the child who truly interests both Jeffrey and Mr. Millhauser. Edwin is Everychild. The biography records the life of a typical youngster from his first painful attempts to speak and make himself understood, through his confrontations with the printed word and experiences in school (with his first flame, the school tough kid, etc.) to the sad time when he must leave his special world, cease to be a carefree child.

Edwin may not be the genius Jeffrey is, but he is still a genius of sorts. "For what is genius," Jeffrey asks, "but the capacity to be obsessed?" And every child is, in a sense, obsessed by play. By this standard, Edwin has more genius than most children, for he is unwilling to give up his obsession and leave childhood behind: "In the Late Years, when most of his contemporaries were slowly being watered down by a dreary round of dull responsibilities and duller pleasures, he alone refused to be diluted, he alone continued to play." The "play" to which Jeffrey refers not only includes Edwin's games and carefree attitude but his art as well. For Jeffrey considers his friend's creative act, the writing of the rather surrealistic *Cartoons* (a novel whose fantastic images are reminiscent of animated films and cartoon strips), to be a kind of game-playing.

Millhauser conveys wonderfully the childhood world that most of us remember with a certain fuzziness. Not only is he able to produce innumerable details that were a part of his and our childhood—the junk candy we consumed (root-beer barrels, red hots, chocolate babies), the junk toys and just plain junk we played with (plastic jumping beans, tattoo strips, wax lips)—but he is also able to project himself into the body and mind of a child, experience and convincingly render the child's peculiar physical and mental perspective.

Brilliant though the novel is, it has its failings. Edwin's experiences are often quite trivial, and even Millhauser's fine language cannot make up for that. At times, the book is too static; scenes accumulate, but the story does not advance. The other problems are mainly those of credibility. Could a genius like Jeffrey, for example, have gone undetected in school? Not once, I believe, does Jeffrey mention a teacher praising him for his extraordinary use of language. Would such a genius have been comfortable in a school of average children? Could an average child like Edwin have produced so sophisticated a work as *Cartoons*?

Still, *Edwin Mullhouse* is a fine piece of work. I admire its intelligence, authority and wit. And I admire most of all the artistry that went into its creation. □

THEATRE

HAROLD CLURMAN

The difficulty in judging a production of a Shakespeare play is that we know either too little or too much about it before seeing it. If it is one of the "histories," we are confused by information and charts culled from the program which graph the intricate family relationships within the royal lineage. Then, too, there are many contradictory critical essays. We may have also seen a number of earlier productions which set up preconceptions. What is more confounding still is that if we read the play before or after seeing it, we find it not readily "decipherable," apart from the beauty of the verse, as literature.

All these hazards beset me when I came upon the Royal Shakespeare Company's *Richard II*, now being shown at the Brooklyn Academy of Music. For this reason, I shall merely summarize what I specifically observed in it, without much reference to my previous acquaintance with the play as text or theatre event.

On the stage, two long flights of steps of silvery hue lead to the upper playing level. These are placed on either side of the main stage space. They may be said to have a symbolic significance: they are the two paths followed by the play's principal antagonists, King Richard and Henry Bolingbroke. They give the setting a distinctly "modern" look; they resemble department store escalators.

The upper stage descends and ascends from time to time, like a lift, effecting a certain visual excitement. Potted plants at the far right and the far left represent a garden; a bit of earth on the forestage, the English soil. The colors throughout, except for the royal robes and crown of gold, are a dull brown or black, with occasional bursts of gleaming white in the costumes. Though I looked upon this chromatic scheme with approval at the start, it soon tends to monotony.

John Barton, the company's Shakespeare scholar, who serves here as the play's director, quite clearly means the production to illustrate what Jan Kott has called the "great machine" of history or politics. At the end of the play, after Bolingbroke (now mounted on the throne as Henry IV) has taken on the robes of his position and expressed his intention to journey to Jerusalem in expiation for his role in Richard's murder, he turns back to us and we see his face or mask transformed into a skeletal death's head.

There are other bits of business which excite momentary pleasure. When, for example, Richard is shot by one of Bolingbroke's crossbowmen, he is hoisted into the air by the chains which bind him, and swings before us in the posture of crucifixion. Another typical moment: Richard, after looking at himself in a mirror, does not simply hurl it down but breaks it by thrusting his head through the glass.

But in this, as in nearly all theatre, the crucial element is the quality of the acting and, still more important, the interpretation of the roles. Ian Richardson and Richard Pasco play Richard II and Bolingbroke respectively. (Both are good actors.) On certain evenings, they switch their assignments—to demonstrate, the director explains, that both represent two sides of the identical royal coin: each in different modes is equally reprehensible, equally pathetic. To make this aspect of the "history" clear, a scene from Henry IV, Part II ("Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown") has been redundantly interpolated.

I saw the play with Ian Richardson as Richard. He played him in a manner which strictly adhered to the director's production idea—as an insincere, prating politico and absolute ruler. No matter how lofty his verbiage, one could see



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the character means much less than he says. Bolingbroke, on the other hand, was matter of fact, hard and much more credible, though he also must be accounted crafty and devious.

This reading of Richard is troublesome; for in his fall he becomes an increasingly moving figure, and his words —in some of the most beautiful lines Shakespeare ever wrote—should not fail to go to one's heart. But on this occasion I was not touched by them. The two aspects of Richard's character were not shaped into a whole. Just as Lear is a fatuously innocent and primitive creature who grows ever closer to us as he suffers humiliation, so Richard, I take it, is at first a vain, self-infatuated young sovereign who believes in his divine right. On no account must he be viewed as a fraud—as historically he may have been, and as he is here played. For in that case, he cannot possibly enlist the sympathy his lines are unmistakably intended to evoke.

W.B. Yeats has spoken of Richard as an artist, a sort of narcissistic Hamlet. And as we all know, many persons of "artistic" disposition make rotten statesmen. That does not mean they are hypocrites. Shakespeare undoubtedly harbored grave misgivings about political leaders, but being of his time (not ours!) he shared some of his countrymen's regard for royalty and portrayed a number of virtuous princes and kings.

In other words, Shakespeare's Richard is much more humanly complex than we in our facile iconoclasm are quick to understand. The "showing up" (or denigration) of Richard, Bolingbroke and the others of their court in the Royal Shakespeare Company's production robs the play of its poetry, of its pathos, of its subtlety and deep pain. It has flattened the insights of a profound creator to something like a poster. There is a certain "modernism" which arrives at "truth" by emptying experience of most of its content, its flesh-and-blood reality.

What may be overlooked in a description of such a production as this *Richard* is that many of its lines as spoken are unintelligible. Some may say that this is to be ascribed to the acoustics of the Brooklyn Academy, a hall larger than the Aldwych Theatre in London, where the production is usually given. But I sat close to the stage and yet missed a good deal of what was said. Most of the company's actors, having been instructed in a technique designed to create chest tones of velvet and oil ("piped-in voices"), do not command a truly *dramatic* speech naturally responsive to the ebb and flow of genuine feeling. Many of them sound as though they were "reciting," though they know they shouldn't and don't wish to.

DUNES

It is always their season
for change, open as they are
to wind from any direction.
Climbing them, we sense how few
shaping breaths have shaped us,
having battened down our lives
for hurricane, ignoring all minor winds
beyond which our real living stands,
sculpted, as if out of stone.

Only the dune remains open.
Our feet sink their trails in its sand.

Paula Rankin

The old-fashioned "emotionalism" of Tony Church's John of Gaunt is more telling than the vocalization in several of the longer roles. The cold acid of Clement McCallin's treacherous Northumberland drives an unerring shaft through the proceedings. He is properly dry, but this should not apply to the production as a whole, which I'm afraid it does. And certain short scenes are wretchedly acted.

I understood every word of *Measure for Measure* in John Houseman's production with the City Center Acting Company. In this regard, as well as in movement, the actors have been well trained. They achieve their distinct articulation by speaking somewhat more deliberately than is perhaps "normal." But it *is* a pleasure to hear what Shakespeare wrote!

In the company's treatment of *Measure for Measure*, the play is transformed from a "black" comedy into a cute one. Perhaps this befits the American youthfulness of its players. In its present stage of development, the company appears too dependent on its directors—which may be the directors' fault. I speak not only of *Measure for Measure* but of the two other productions I saw: *The Three Sisters* and *Beggar's Opera*. It is time for the actors to be allowed greater freedom, more breathing room. They often seem to be toeing a prescribed line, and that makes them seem like "beginners." Their productions might be more advantageously seen in other than a large Broadway house. But they are an *ensemble*—which is very much in their favor. I hope I cause it no hurt by saying that David Ogden Stiers now seems the "ripest" in the company. His Kulygin in *The Three Sisters* is one of the best I've seen.

Jack Gelber's *Barbary Shore*, adapted from the novel by Norman Mailer, because of its episodic or "novelistic" form and because of its material, may strike some people as passé or dull. (Public Theatre.) Still, it interested me. It is about the convoluted psychology of a fundamentally romantic person who has committed himself all his life long to a supposed "materialistic" revolutionary cause. The play is well acted by a good cast: Rip Torn, Lenny Baker, Lane Smith and Estelle Parsons. If the opportunity presents itself at a later date, I may return to a fuller discussion of the play's merit. □

DANCE

NANCY GOLDNER

Our concept of classical dancing comes from the late 19th-century Russian ballets of Petipa and Ivanov, and from Balanchine, Russian-trained. American Ballet Theatre has presented a totally different kind of classical dancing with its production of divertissements from *Napoli* (1842), choreographed by Bournonville. He was prolific and also founded a national style (in Denmark), but except for *La Sylphide* and a part of *Konservatoriet*, he is an unknown quantity in the United States. The *Napoli* suite, a series of sextets, trios, duets and solos from the full-length *Napoli*, is the purest dose of Bournonville style now available here. It reminds one that Petipa is only one side of the coin.

Both Bournonville and Petipa show favoritism toward certain steps, though Petipa's vocabulary would seem to be more flexible and Bournonville's favoritism more intense. Because of this, one is acutely aware of what steps Bournonville uses and does not use. He is all jumps—*brisé*, *jeté*, *entrechat* and *rond de jambe*. He does not favor the staples —*passé*, arabesque or any other kind of leg extension; he uses no turns except pirouettes for the men and no *pas de chat*, which is a curious omission because it is a sprightly jump. Meanwhile, these steps are paramount in Petipa. The mutual exclusivity of basic vocabulary suggests that the two men had their own Congress of Vienna, split the wealth in half, and went back to their respective turfs, never to swap booty again.

Bournonville's method of putting steps together is also more intense than Petipa's. In the *Napoli* variations there are no transitional steps—no preparatory hops, called *sous sous*, onto the toes, no poses with only the arms moving, no *chassés* and *balancés*, and little *pas de bourrée*. The men, in their variations, do not run to the other side of the stage when they've finished a series of virtuoso jumps on the diagonal. Bournonville does not use the long diagonal anyway, but if he did the man would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have to dance his way through the logistical maneuver. Since all the steps are allegro and executed without break, producing a bouncing-ball effect, the dancers get no muscular respite in their legs, and the audience no visual respite. The concentration and speed of Bournonville surpasses even Balanchine, although both choreographers require the dancer to unleash energy in a sustained climax. With its musical complexities and on many occasions poetic depth, Balanchine ballet is felt keenly in the mind and is more stimulating than exhausting. For sheer physical exhilaration Bournonville is supreme, but he is exhausting. After *Napoli*, you have had it, and I wish that American Ballet Theatre had placed it last, rather than first, on the bill.

Bournonville's speed and concentration are almost as extreme at the opposite poles as are the current slow-motion dances. What lifts him far above the doctrinaire and classroom-exercise category (characteristics that afflict much of the slow-motion studies) are two felicitous complexities. The dancer's line of direction is so important and so varied that in itself it almost constitutes a whole other vocabulary of movement. A limited number of steps are done in what seems to be an unlimited number of directions. Each position is firmly articulated but fleeting, since one step follows on the heels of the next. The ideal Bournonville dancer might resemble a rotating beam of light in its true aspect, as distinct particles. Compared to Bournonville, Petipa designed in blocks of steps—three to the left, three to the right, and so on. Bournonville is much less predictable. Steps fall into a 2-1-1-3-2 sequence, essentially patternless. Though the dancer must be ambidextrous, there is no left-right symmetry. Petipa makes a definite distinction between dancing in place and in space. The first is stage center; the second is a circle or diagonal. A Bournonville dancer darts here and there, in no recognizable floor plan. Bournonville's avoidance of symmetry and blocklike composition makes him more modern than he at first might seem. Modernity is not the point, however; the point is dazzling, effervescent dancing.

One area in which Bournonville showed little interest is supported adagio movement for a man and woman. In the *Flower Festival pas de deux*, which has been inserted into the *Napoli* variations, though it belongs to the ballet *Flower Festival in Genzano* (1858), the man rarely balances the woman while she is on *pointe*. Mostly they dance side by side, their arms around each other's waists, and taking the same steps. Occasionally she will dip into a high arabesque with him holding her waist, but since she does this on a flat foot, his support is merely ornamental. By not considering elaborate *pas de deux*, Bournonville by-passed one if not the main line of choreographic development, for today the *pas de deux* is often a ballet's most sublime passage. On the other hand, Bournonville's lack of sexual distinction in solos as well as duets is an antidote to the male baggage-porter syndrome. Had Bournonville's style been the dominant one in the 19th century, the ballerina might not have been deformed into a prima donna. There might not have developed a star system either for women or men, in which each sex, using the other's temporary ascendancy as stimulus for claims to the crown, rides on alternate waves of reaction.

The one area in which Bournonville may be deemed retardative is music. Divertissements from *Napoli* use tunes by Paulli, Gelsted and Gade, who make Glinka and Minkus sound as sophisticated and beautiful as Tchaikovsky. Paulli et al. provide a cheery atmosphere but Bournonville could have replaced them with drumbeats. He could not compose musical choreography because there was no musical foundation. Thus it is very hard for the dancer to phrase Bournonville—that is, to arrange the steps into predicates, clauses and sentences. The difficulty arises not only out of musical deficiency but out of Bournonville's avoidance of symmetry and blocklike composition. Dancers often add their own flourish of musicality by accenting already given dynamics, by jamming a few steps together so as to have lots of time for the self-appointed important step, which is usually a balance on one foot. Bournonville, however, is too compact for such manipulation; besides, it would be out of keeping with his essentially impersonal, pristine (true-blue classical?) style. Yet if the dancer does not find a legible order in all the bouncing jumps, he risks looking like a jumping jack. I have been told that dancers long acquainted with Bournonville's choreography know how to elucidate the parts within the whole. Novices in the Danish school, the American Ballet Theatre dancers looked well enough, perhaps because the choreography is irresistible, but it was phrasing that I missed most. Sufficient speed was also missing, and often the conductor had to de-accelerate in mid course. The *Flower Festival pas de deux* presented a different kind of challenge, for charm and good manners are as important as technique.

I relate the following tale because in a *pas de deux* good manners are always as intrinsic to the choreography as is

THE NATION

Reprints Available

THE LONG CHILDHOOD
by J. Bronowski
The last chapter of his forthcoming book, **"The Ascent of Man."** An idea-packed hymn to mankind. (Dec. 31, 1973) .....50¢ ea.

KANGAROO GRAND JURIES by Frank J. Donner and Richard I. Lavine
How the Grand Jury's traditional protection of the individual was corrupted to funnel the fruits of illegal surveillance into the centralized intelligence of Nixon's "besieged" Administration.
(Nov. 19, 1973) .....50¢ ea.

CONFRONTING NIXON, an editorial by Carey McWilliams discussing the measures to be taken in dealing with the Presidential crisis.
(Nov. 5, 1973) ..... 25¢ ea.

THE HUBRIS OF A PRESIDENT
by William L. Shirer
Troublesome similarities between Nazi Germany and the United States today.
(Jan. 22, 1973) .....25¢ ea.

THE WIRED NATION
by Ralph Lee Smith
The award-winning in-depth study of Cable TV and its many political ramifications.
(May 18, 1970) .....40¢ ea.

THE PRESS AND THE BAY OF PIGS
by Victor Bernstein and Jesse Gordon
How a November 1960 editorial in The NATION blew the whistle on the build-up for the Bay of Pigs, and how the rest of the media held its ears for six months.
(From the Columbia University Forum, Fall 1967 issue) .....15¢ ea.

- **20% off on orders of 10 copies or more.**
- **Please include payment with order.**

Reprint Department
The NATION
333 Sixth Ave.
New York, N. Y. 10014

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

technical bravura. On one evening Eleanor D'Antuono was partnered by Fernando Bujones. Bujones' feet are impeccably pointed, his legs are eloquently taut, he jumps with an exciting spring and he jumps high. He has the makings of a great dancer, and from the waist down he already is. At one point he and D'Antuono do a *grand jeté* to the side, followed by a little promenade with his arm around her waist. The idea is delicacy and speed. Bujones, however, decided to make the *jeté* into a major male variation. Grinning at the audience (instead of smiling at his partner), he jumped so high that he could not get down in time to escort D'Antuono in the promenade. Leaving her stranded and confused, he then crashed into her when he did touch the floor. With that degree of self-absorption, Bujones is as ill-prepared to be a *danseur noble* in a duet as he would be had he club feet. Such are the perils of the star system, which can mangle the very choreographer who might have saved us from it. □

ART

LAWRENCE ALLOWAY

In his recent article on "Earth Art" (*The Nation*, December 24), Roy Bongartz discussed both the difficulties and the aesthetic rewards of visiting Earthworks in Nevada. An Earthwork, as a form of sculpture that takes the existing terrain for its medium, is capable of expansion far out of the usual scale of art. In Utah, "The Spiral Jetty" by Robert Smithson coils out into the Great Salt Lake, a 1,500-foot-long helix constructed of earth and rocks taken from the shore. Smithson made a film of this work, which was shown originally in 1970. He died last year at the age of 35 in a plane crash while photographing "Amarillo Ramp," a new Earthwork in Texas. *The Spiral Jetty*, the film, was shown again in Cineprobe, arranged by the Museum of Modern Art's Film Department in early January to commemorate Smithson's work.

As a rule, people who know about Earthworks do not have easy access to them. Hence the use of both still and movie photography to record the far-away sites. Smithson's film is more than a record, however, though it does function in that way. The film, in part, follows the form of a task-fulfillment documentary like, say, Joris Ivins' *Earth*. The artist paces out the spiral in the shallow, red waters of the dead lake; earth-moving equipment swipes up rocks and rubble and begins edging out into the lake, building the causeway bit by bit. The naturalistic celebration of technology at the service of the artist's will, well photographed in a clear, expository style, is interrupted in two ways. The machines are compared to prehistoric animals, with images of earth-mover and dinosaur intercut: extinct creature and current model, prehistory and technology, are linked.

In addition, Smithson makes extensive use of maps—of the prehistoric earth, of the presumed location of Atlantis, of a rumored underground tunnel joining the Great Salt Lake to the Pacific Ocean. This introduces Smithson's conviction that all systems of mapping, i.e., all forms of communication, are partial and vulnerable to error. In addition, it excavates a sense of time behind the documentary imagery, evoking a dimension of prehistory and rumor. Apart from the themes of uncertainty (in mapping) and expansive time (the archaeological present), there are references to popular movies of the recent past. Unlike most films made by artists, which belong to provincial genres of experimental cinema, Smithson's film is made with reference to popular cinema, especially to Universal-International science fiction movies of the 1950s (such as *Tarantula*) and Roger Corman's thrillers and horror films. These references contribute to Smithson's evocation of time by generating an apprehensive and expectant mood centered on the work under construction.

The second half of the film, with the jetty completed, is photographed almost entirely from a helicopter, with aerial views implying both personal vertigo and solar extension as the sun is reflected between the rings and then from the heart of the spiral. The commentary, read by Smithson, consists mainly of quotations—from an early science fiction novel *The Time Stream* by John Taine, ramblings from a Charles Manson follower, crisp detail from a medical dictionary, on topics ranging from a view of a multitude of galaxies to an inventory of degrees of sunstroke. The jetty, which in building supported a great range of temporal references, when built is opened out into spatial metaphors of ascending magnitude. Smithson uses the reflective surface of the lake to establish a fluctuating scale, from objective size to analogues both large and small, as the spiral, in its bed of amniotic red water, is photographed from a mobile camera spinning above it.

The film derives from a form of art that Smithson devised in 1968 and which he called "Sites-Nonsites." Briefly, he would select a place, often in his native New Jersey, but sometimes ranging farther afield, and then assemble material pertaining to the site. Typically the Nonsite would consist of maps, photographs and rock samples from the original site, the rocks being contained in bins shaped to echo some feature of the site. In this double relationship, to quote the artist, "two-dimensional and three-dimensional things trade places with each other in the range of convergence. Large scale becomes small, small scale becomes large. A point on a map expands to the size of a land mass. A land mass contracts into a point." "The rules of this network of signs are discovered as you go along uncertain trails both mental and physical" (Robert Smithson, "The Spiral Jetty," in *Arts of the Environment*, edited by G. Kepes).

Thus the film is the equivalent of a Nonsite, part of a network of signs subject to the restrictions and transformations that pervade all conventional sign systems. Smithson does not lament this restriction, by claiming as, say, Ezra Pound did, that the state of language causes a perversion of good, clean statements. On the contrary, he accepted the flawed channels of communication as being all that artists, like everybody else, have to work with. At the end of the film the helicopter follows a running figure, the artist himself, from the outside edge of the spiral to its center. The image alludes to the airborne pursuit of people on the ground in such movies as *North by Northwest* (small plane after a man on foot) or *The Las Vegas Story* (a duel between a helicopter and a car). When Smithson reaches the center of the spiral he can be said to have penetrated his own work to the core. Is it a romantic image of withdrawal or a narcissistic absorption in art that is proposed? What actually happens is that the helicopter pulls back sharply and the spiral swings vertiginously across the screen—and Smithson turns and starts walking out of the spiral. This sober and factual point, within the dramatic convention taken from popular movies, is typical of Smithson's blend of high imagination and skeptical exactness.

A similar complex sanity characterizes his view of nature, that term so often set into contest in an art-nature or machine-nature confrontation. For him there was no conflict between, to use Leo Marx's terms, the "machine" and the "garden." It was by means of technology that Smithson was able to create his art in the American landscape, but the forms are not interruptions of the terrain, they are extensions of it, using the local materials on site as an inherent medium. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Crossword Puzzle No. 1522

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

8 The Treasury of the Union Federation? There are many things one should be able to do. (4-2-3-6)
9 One on thin ice possibly takes a twist to the right. (6)
10 Its fancy arrangement is set apart as sacred. (8)
11 What the victorious poilu sometimes had to go through! (4)
13 After Christmas, one doesn't dare to make him responsible for play. (4,6)
15 Making ruts, due to being all tied up. (7)
16 Drops an egg at a place where you can't find it? (7)
19 Big shots aren't supposed to work, evidently—they're just part of the machine. (4,6)
21 Just a faint voice in the chorus? (4)
22 Fasten something, however not back at a higher point. (6,2)
24 There's an element of mud mixed with bad air. (6)
26 The first is no longer considered always last, descriptive of a comparatively large gambler. (6,3,6)

DOWN

1 It's supposed to sound unobtrusive. (10,5)
2 A little play, but one shouldn't take it seriously. (4)
3 See 12 down
4 The type that can't hold liquor might make spectacles of themselves. (7)
5 Is such a joke somewhat racy, and thus in bad taste? (6)
6 Obviously not all in play! (4)
7 Pilgrim's Progress was his theme, but not his title. (8,7)
12 and 3 down Not a residence fairly near Newark—it's more for the family. (5,2,6)
14 The writer of *Ah, Wilderness?* (5)
17 Mark the character of Robin's crib, everyone! (8)
18 Assisting in the serving? (7)
20 What one sometimes does besides love and obey, if not considered too old-fashioned. (6)
23 The runner sometimes does this up before starting off, though one might do things up before using them. (4)
25 Palm Sunday invariably falls on one. (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1521

ACROSS: 1 Acotyledonous; 10 Shrug; 11 Test pilot; 12 Enlargers; 13 Sense; 14 Common gossip; 19 Solzhenitsyn; 22 Tonic; 24 Slippered; 25 Antalkali; 26 Angle; 27 Knuckle-duster. DOWN: 2 Circle; 3 Tiger moth; 4 Letter man; 5 Discs; 6 Napes; 7 Ugliness; 8 Aspen; 9 Attempt; 15 Nitrified; 16 Olympians; 17 Ashtray; 18 Plankton; 20 Brogue; 21 Adder; 23 Colic; 24 Stall.

Readers are invited to send for a free copy of Mr. Lewis' "ground rules." Address Puzzle Department, *The Nation*, 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10014.

MUSIC

RELIVE OLD RADIO!! 1,500 classic broadcasts (1920-1960) available—cassettes/ 8-tracks/ reels. Catalogue: $2.00, refundable. **American Radio Heritage Institute, Box 3493-N, Riverside, Calif. 92509.**

FREE 200-PAGE CATALOG. 1,400 New Stereo Recordings. Renaissance, Baroque, Classical, Romantic, Modern Music. Not sold in stores. Not listed in Schwann's. Highest quality! Budget label prices! Available only by mail. **MUSICAL HERITAGE SOCIETY, Box 932 NA, New York, N.Y. 10023.**

EDUCATIONAL

RUSSIAN LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION by mail. Untested method, but cheap—take a chance. **R. Karamazov, 3041 Moreland Avenue, Baltimore, Md. 21234.**

LITERARY SERVICES

YOUR BOOK printed from well typed manuscript. Any quantity, economical. **Biography Press, Rt. 1, Box 745, Aransas Pass, TX 78336.**

PUBLICATIONS

NEW WOMAN'S SURVIVAL CATALOGUE. $5.50 postpaid. **Papyrus Books, Dept. GLC, 2915 Broadway, N. Y., N. Y. 10025.**

INVESTIGATIVE REPORTER—Monthly Expose of High and Low on Current Scene. 12 issues, $12. **P.O. Box 7218, Jackson Heights, N.Y. 11372.**

SECURITY

BUGGED??? . . .Electronic Detector Locates Hidden Transmitters. Literature—25¢. **Security Devices, P.O. Box 671, Dept. N, Westwood, N.J. 07675.**

SERVICES

QUICK (BUT CAREFUL) MOVERS. Household or commercial. Realistic estimates. Reasonable rates. Insured. No job too small. **(212) 673-5341.**

MOVING? Professional moving at competitive rates. Anytime, anywhere. Licensed, insured, experienced. **THE COVERED WAGON, ALgonquin 5-1788 (N.Y.C.)**

PERSONALS

END EXPLOITATION, OPPRESSION AND WARS. Build a friendly, classless, democratic world. Join the **Socialist Party, U.S.A., 1012 N. Third St., Milwaukee, Wis. 53203.**

RATIOCINATIVITY, cognizance, and the capacity to feel pleasure and pain are the three categories of ethics. Diploidness, species, and biological life are NOT categories of ethics. Self-sovereignty to ratiocinating beings; sanctity to cognizant beings; and courtesy to their wanted offspring.—**ABOLISH ALL ABORTION LAWS, POB 36122, Los Angeles 90036.**

TOPICAL BUMPERSTICKERS! "Impeach Nixon!," "Don't Blame Me I Voted For McGovern," "Nixon: America's No. 1 Non-Taxpayer," "Energy Crisis Or Corporate Robbery?," "Nixon Gives Me Gas Pains!," "More Gas and Less Nixon!," "Nixon For Ex-President," "Bust the Oil Trust," "Visit San Clemente (You Paid For It!)," "Prices Too High? Nixon's The One," "No Amnesty For Nixon," "Honk If You Think He's Guilty!," "Impeachment With Honor!." Colorful vinyl. 2/$1, 6/$2, 20/$5. Bulk/Wholesale discounts. **CHECKERS ENTERPRISES, Box 942C, St. Louis, Mo. 63188.**

ADVERTISE YOUR NEEDS IN THE NATION

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



A Distinguished Tradition

Traditionally, The NATION ends each year with an issue of special significance. 1973 was no exception. The feature of our Dec. 31, 1973 issue was the last chapter of "The Ascent of Man," Dr. J. Bronowski's new book to be published soon by Little, Brown and Company.

This was the third time The NATION featured a piece by Dr. Bronowski. On Dec. 29, 1956, we carried his "Science and Human Values"; then on Jan. 4, 1964, "The Abacus and the Rose." His latest article, though only 6½ pages long, is filled with enough ideas to stimulate hours of thought and discussion.

The multi-faceted Dr. Bronowski—historian, mathematician, poet, teacher, biologist—is at present a Senior Fellow of the Salk Institute for Biological Studies in San Diego. Scientific humanist that he is, his literary style is both profound and loving. His new book traces man's development in terms of the special gifts which make him unique among the animals.



The author at his home, with an endocast of the Taung child's skull. A copy of his book, "The Identity of Man" is on the table. La Jolla, California 1973

SUBSCRIBE NOW!

and you will receive a FREE COPY of our special Dec. 31st issue

The NATION, 333 Sixth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10014

Please enter my subscription to The NATION for the term checked below, and include a FREE COPY of the Dec. 31, 1973 issue featuring Dr. J. Bronowski's article from "The Ascent of Man."

( ) 12 months (48 issues) at $15.00
( ) 24 months (96 issues) at $27.50
( ) 6 months (24 issues) at $ 9.00

(Add $1.00 per year postage for Canada and Mexico)
(Add $2.00 per year for other foreign countries)

1-26-74

PRINT
Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

☐ Payment enclosed ☐ Bill me

If you are not a subscriber to The NATION, this is a good time to become one. Fill out the coupon at the left so that you will be among the first to see Dr. Bronowski's essay.

The NATION makes an ideal Gift Subscription. If you order one, please specify to whom the free copy of the Dec. 31, 1973 issue should go . . . to you, or to the recipient.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED